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. I. INTRODUCTION
FTER surveying its most recent securities fraud opinions, theASupreme Court declared: "Separation of powers, a distinctively
American political doctrine, profits from the advice authored by
a distinctively American poet: Good fences make good neighbors."1 If
only the Supreme Court had followed Robert Frost's advice.
Instead, in its securities fraud decisions, the Court has readily, and even
expressly, crossed the fence that separates the legislative and judicial
powers. In doing so, the Court has not been reticent about its political
desire to protect defendants from exposure to securities fraud litigation
and liability.2 It has created the perception that it is engaging in "preter-
natural solicitousness for corporate well-being and ... callousness toward
the investing public." 3
This Article shows just how the Supreme Court's securities fraud deci-
sions have created that perception. In particular, the Article demon-
strates that the Court's most recent securities fraud opinions appear to be
reconcilable only in their consistent protection of defendants from liabil-
ity for securities fraud. Nonetheless, this Article finds, within the Court's
apparently unprincipled and result-guided decisions, a unifying jurisdic-
tional principle. That basic principle prevents the federal courts from ac-
cepting independent subject-matter jurisdiction over implied rights of
action for securities fraud, but requires them to accept subject-matter ju-
risdiction over express rights of action for securities fraud. This jurisdic-
tional principle reconciles the Supreme Court's apparently inconsistent,
policy-driven implied right of action decisions. Ultimately, however, this
Article concludes that the basic jurisdictional principle is disserved by the
Court's most recent rejection of Congress' express remedies for securities
fraud.
In Part II, this Article analyzes the Supreme Court's implied private
right of action decisions. These opinions appear to be guided by the
Court's desire to protect defendants from exposure to implied securities
fraud remedies. In its most recent decisions, in fact, the Court has cre-
ated an implied right of action for contribution on behalf of alleged par-
ticipants in securities fraud, but has rejected an implied right of action
against those same participants for aiding and abetting securities fraud.
These latest decisions significantly enhance the appearance that the Court
is guided by its political goal of protecting defendants from exposure to
securities fraud liability.
1. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1447, 1463 (1995) (Scalia, J.).
2. See, e.g., Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350,
358-59 (1991); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,214 n.33 (1976) (citing Blue Chip
Stamps, 421 U.S. 723, 747-48 (1975)); Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 739, 742.
3. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 762 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Part III of this Article describes how the appearance of result-guided
reasoning is reinforced by Alloyd 4 and Plaut,5 the Court's most recent
decisions interpreting express securities fraud remedies. These decisions
reject clear congressional language that expressly grants to the federal
courts jurisdiction over express federal securities fraud remedies. The
reasoning in these decisions is unpersuasive and inconsistent. Part III
concludes with a chart graphically illustrating that all of the Supreme
Court's decisions interpreting express and implied remedies for securities
fraud appear to be consistent only in their protection of defendants from
the reach of those remedies. Moreover, as demonstrated in Part IV, the
Court's policy objective of protecting defendants from exposure to securi-
ties fraud liability itself has no legitimate empirical support.
In Part V, however, this Article discovers within the Court's recent se-
curities fraud decisions a jurisdictional principle that helps to reconcile
these apparently result-guided and otherwise irreconcilable decisions.
The jurisdictional principle is that the federal courts have the power to
recognize implied private rights of action if, but only if, they have subject-
matter jurisdiction by an express right of action. The principle's corollary
is that the federal courts have no power to decline to exercise subject-
matter jurisdiction over rights of action expressly delegated to them by
Congress. This jurisdictional principle justifies the Court's restriction
upon implied rights of action. It even reconciles the Court's creation of
an implied right of action for contribution with its rejection of an implied
right of action for aiding and abetting. The principle's corollary, how-
ever, shows that the Court's rejection of express securities fraud remedies
cannot be justified.
This Article concludes by calling for a return to fundamental jurisdic-
tional principles. Such a return is particularly vital in an environment in
which Congress has revisited the political issues surrounding the proper
regulation of securities transactions.
II. THE COURT'S APPARENT "GUERRILLA WARFARE" ON
IMPLIED RIGHTS OF ACTION
A. THE SUPREME COURT'S HISTORY OF LIMITING JUDICIALLY
CREATED SECURITIES FRAUD REMEDIES
The federal courts have recognized implied rights of action for fraud in
connection with proxy solicitation under section 14(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934 Act"), 6 and for fraud in connection with
4. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061 (1995).
5. 115 S. Ct. at 1447.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1994). Section 14(a) makes it "unlawful for any person ... in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe.., to solicit
or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy ... in respect of any security ...
registered [on a national securities exchange] .... " Id. SEC Rule 14a-9 prohibits material
misstatements or omissions in connection with proxy solicitation. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9
(1995).
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securities transactions under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.7 In Borak,8
the Supreme Court recognized an implied private right of action for
proxy fraud, reasoning that the federal courts have the power to create
remedies for violations of federal statutes, even when Congress has failed
to do so.9 The Supreme Court has "repeatedly reaffirmed"' 10 the section
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994). More civil actions have been filed under § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 than under any other provision of the federal securities
laws. See, e.g., ALFRED F. CONRAD ET AL., ENTERPRISE ORGANIZATION 991 (3d ed. 1982)
("Since the first civil action sired by Rule lob-5 pecked its way out of the eggshell in 1947,
its progeny have multiplied to become the most litigated segment of the SEC's
jurisdiction.").
More scholarship has been devoted to the private right of action for violations of § 10(b)
than to any other securities law issue. The quantity of the scholarship devoted to § 10(b) is
manifest by the attention given just to the issue of the implied right of action. Roy L.
Brooks, Rule lOb-5 in the Balance: An Analysis of the Supreme Court's Policy Perspective,
32 HASTINGS L.J. 403 (1980); see, e.g., Alfred F. Conrad, Securities Regulation in the Burger
Court, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 193 (1985); Tamar Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA.
L. REV. 553 (1981); Thomas L. Hazen, Implied Private Remedies Under Federal Statutes:
Neither a Death Knell Nor a Moratorium-Civil Rights, Securities Regulation, and Beyond,
33 VAND. L. REV. 1333 (1980); John A. Maher, Implied Private Right of Action and the
Federal Securities Laws: A Historical Perspective, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 783 (1980);
John A. Maher & Joan D. Maher, Statutorily Implied Federal Causes of Action After Mer-
rill Lynch: How Sad It Is; How Simple It Could Be, 88 DICK. L. REv. 593 (1984); William F.
Schneider, Implying Private Rights and Remedies Under the Federal Securities Acts, 62 N.C.
L. REV. 853 (1984); Marc I. Steinberg, The Propriety and Scope of Cumulative Remedies
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 557 (1982); Marc I. Steinberg,
Implied Private Rights of Action Under Federal Law, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 33 (1979).
Section 10(b) itself is the subject of multi-volume treatises. See ALAN R. BROMBERG &
LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, BROMBERG AND LOwENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODI-
TIES FRAUD (2d ed. 1994); ARNOLD S. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE
1OB-5 (2d ed. 1981). Despite the quantity of this scholarship devoted to § 10(b) and the
implied private right of action, none of it addresses the constitutional legitimacy of thejudicial recognition of a private remedy based on federal court remedial power or legisla-
tive acquiescence.
Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person... (b) [t]o use or employ, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security ... any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994).
Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R § 240.10b-5 (1995).
8. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
9. Id. at 433-35.
10. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 n.10 (1983) (citing
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 196).
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10(b)" private remedy for securities fraud and declared its existence to
be "well established"' 2 and "simply beyond peradventure."' 13 Yet the
Supreme Court has never squarely held that a private right of action may
be inferred from section 10(b). Instead, the Court has merely assumed
the existence of the private remedy for purposes of erecting necessary
elements for recovery, such as scienter,14 standing,15 deception,' 6 exclu-
sivity, 17 materiality,' 8 reliance,' 9 the statute of limitations, 20 contribu-
tion,21 and aiding and abetting.22
The Court's current dissatisfaction with the justifications for the judi-
cial creation of private remedies, however, has led some of its members
to insist that such remedies should never be created,23 while others hint
that even the well-established section 10(b) and section 14(a) private
remedies may be ripe for reconsideration.24 The Court has expressed its
dissatisfaction with the existence of those remedies by narrowing their
reach. In Virginia Bankshares, the Court confined the section 14(a) im-
plied private right of action for proxy fraud to those plaintiffs who control
votes required to authorize the corporate action subject to the challenged
proxy solicitation.25 In that case, Justice Kennedy even observed that the
Court had declared "guerrilla warfare" 26 against private rights of action
under the federal securities laws. He cautioned: "Congress and those
charged with enforcement of the securities laws stand forewarned that
unresolved questions concerning the scope of those causes of action are
likely to be answered by the Court in favor of defendants." '27
Justice Kennedy's warning was justified. With limited exception, the
Supreme Court has restricted the scope of the implied private remedies
11. Since its inception in 1946, the judicially created private remedy for violations of
§ 10(b) has become a significant supplement to the SEC's effort to enforce the federal
securities laws, and has become an important source of compensation for defrauded securi-
ties investors. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230-31 (1988).
12. Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 380 n.70 (quoting Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 196).
13. Id. at 380. See also Basic, 485 U.S. at 230-31.
14. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 197.
15. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730.
16. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471 (1977).
17. Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 387.
18. Basic, 485 U.S. at 249-50.
19. Id.
20. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 358-59.
21. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins., 113 S. Ct. 2085, 2091 (1993).
22. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1455 (1994).
23. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 365 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Thompson v. Thompson, 484
U.S. 174, 190-92 (1988); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730-49 (1979)
(Powell, J., dissenting)).
24. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2092 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun and
O'Connor, JJ.) ("We again have no cause to reconsider whether the 10b-5 action should
have been recognized at all."). See also Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S.
1083, 1104 n.11 (1991) ("The object of our enquiry does not extend further to question the
holding of [Borak] at this date .... ) (emphasis supplied).
25. Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1099-1108.
26. Id. at 1115 (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part, joined by Ste-
vens, Blackmun, and Marshall, JJ.).
27. Id.
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for securities fraud in each of its decisions interpreting those remedies. 28
Those decisions have been expressly guided by the Court's distaste for
implied remedies. In Virginia Bankshares, the Court began its restriction
of the definition of "causation" in section 14(a) claims by announcing that
"fundamental principles" of judicial power, which were not the "consid-
ered focus" of Borak, require the Court to reject an extension of judi-
cially-created private remedies. 29 Similarly, in Blue Chip Stamps, the
Supreme Court based its decision to deny section 10(b) standing to mere
offerees of securities upon the uncertain origins of the private remedy:
When we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal with a
judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative
acorn.... It is therefore proper that we consider.., what may be
described as policy considerations when we come to flesh out the
portions of the law .... 30
The Court further decided that "[g]iven the peculiar blend of legisla-
tive, administrative and judicial history which now surrounds Rule 10b-5,
practical factors.., are entitled to a good deal of weight. '31
The practical, policy reason for the Court's restriction of section 10(b)
liability is the concern for the "danger of vexatious litigation which could
result from a widely expanded class of plaintiffs under Rule 10b-5."'32
The Court acknowledged that in fashioning its limitation on section 10(b)
liability it did not dismiss as a "factor" that its result "makes it easier,
rather than more difficult, for a defendant to obtain summary judg-
ment. '33 The justification for the Court's desire to protect defendants
from liability is the uncertain judicial origin of the private remedy.34
Similarly, in Hochfelder, the Court's transparent dissatisfaction with
the existence of the section 10(b) private action drove its rejection of any
such action based on allegations of mere negligence. 35 The Court argued
that because it is dealing with a "judicially implied liability," 36 the statu-
tory language, which seems to require intentional misconduct, could fore-
close "further inquiry" in cases where proof of such intent is lacking. 37
Whereas the Court in Blue Chip Stamps argued that the judicial origins of
the section 10(b) private remedy justify its reliance on policy considera-
28. See, e.g., Lampf, 501 U.S. at 364 (finding no private right of action if filed more
than three years after the challenged transaction or one year from discovery); Santa Fe
Indus., 430 U.S. at 479 (finding no private right of action for corporate mismanagement);
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193 (asserting that no private right of action will lie for negligence);
Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730 (finding no private right of action for offerees of stock
who neither purchased nor sold securities). But see Basic, 485 U.S. at 230-31; Huddleston,
459 U.S. at 384.
29. Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1102.
30. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 737.
31. Id. at 749.
32. Id. at 740.
33. Id. at 742.
34. Id at 762 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
35. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193.
36. Id. at 200.
37. Id. at 201.
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tions,38 the Court in Hochfelder argued to the contrary that those origins
require strict adherence to the statutory language. 39
Nonetheless, the Hochfelder Court proceeded to argue that the unique
role of the section 10(b) remedy within the federal securities laws also
supports its denial of that remedy for negligent conduct.4 ( After observ-
ing that the express remedies created by the federal securities laws carry
express procedural restrictions not present in the context of the implied
section 10(b) remedy, the Court concluded: "We think those procedural
limitations indicate that the judicially created private damages remedy
under § 10(b)-which has no comparable restrictions-cannot be ex-
tended, consistently with the intent of Congress, to actions premised on
negligent wrongdoing."'41 The Court reasoned that because recovery
under the express remedies of the securities laws is subject to express
procedural requirements, recovery under the implied section 10(b) rem-
edy should at least be subject to implied substantive limitations.42 This
argument can be seen as the product of the Court's fundamental dislike
for the section 10(b) implied remedy and its desire to limit its use. In-
deed, Hochfelder cites Blue Chip Stamps with approval for its "concern
that the inexorable broadening of the class of plaintiffs who may sue in
this area of the law will ultimately result in more harm than good."
43
The Supreme Court also based its Lampf decision, which created a uni-
form, retroactive statute of limitations period for private section 10(b)
actions, on the uncertain judicial origins of those actions."4 There, the
Court itself complained that its task in defining the section 10(b) limita-
tions period is made "awkward" 45 and "complicated by the nontradi-
tional origins of the § 10(b) cause of action."'46 Justice Scalia agreed that
the case presents a "distinctive difficulty because it involves one of those
so-called 'implied' causes of action that, for several decades, this Court
was prone to discover in-or, more accurately, create in reliance upon-
federal legislation."'47 Because, as Justice Scalia frankly acknowledged,
the Court is "imagining," it conjures a retroactive limitations period that
limits the section 10(b) remedy.48 Absent any such guidance, the Court
38. 421 U.S. at 737.
39. 425 U.S. at 201.
40. Id. at 208-12.
41. Id. at 210. Ironically, one of the procedural barriers not present in § 10(b) actions
cited by the Court is the relatively short statute of limitations period governing the express
rights of action. Id at 210 n.29. The irony, of course, is that the Supreme Court in Lampf
created a uniform statute of limitations period for § 10(b) actions based on the limitations
periods for those express rights of action. 501 U.S. at 358-60.
42. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 210.
43. Id. at 214 n.33 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 747-48).
44. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 358.
45. Id. at 359.
46. Id. at 358.
47. Id. at 365 (Scalia, J., concurring).
48. Id at 365-66.
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blatantly acknowledges that it interprets the implied securities fraud rem-
edies on its own, embarking on a "lawless" act of "imagining. '49
B. MUSICK AND CENTRAL BANK: THE SUPREME COURT'S
APPARENTLY IRRECONCILABLE APPROACH TO IMPLIED
SECURITIES FRAUD REMEDIES
The Supreme Court's recent Musicks° and Central Banks' decisions ap-
pear to be reconcilable only in their consistent protection of defendants
from exposure to securities fraud liability.
1. Musick: The Supreme Court's Creation of an Implied Right to
Contribution
a. The Musick Decision
In Musick, the Supreme Court created an implied right of action for
contribution under section 10(b). 52 In doing so, the Court acknowledged
that the underlying section 10(b) private remedy derives from a "theory"
of judicial power to "supplement federal statutory duties" rather than a
theory of congressional intent.5 3 The Court further acknowledged that
under its own precedent, the creation of rights of action "ought to be left
to legislatures, not courts. ' 54 This is an implicit recognition by the
Supreme Court that the "theory" of judicial power which gave birth to
the section 10(b) private remedy is no longer sound.5 5 Rather than con-
front the constitutional propriety of the section 10(b) private remedy,
however, the Court again assumed the remedy's existence for purposes of
interpreting its scope.
The Court based its decision to recognize a new implied right to contri-
bution under section 10(b) on the very fact that the section 10(b) private
remedy is a judicial creation. The Court suggested that but for the judi-
cial origins of the section 10(b) private remedy, it would follow its recent
precedents 56 rejecting implied rights to contribution under comparable
federal regulatory schemes.57 Despite the section 10(b) private action's
49. Id
50. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins., 113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993).
51. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
52. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2091.
53. Id. at 2088 (asserting that the search for congressional intent to create the right
would be futile) (citing Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730, 737).
54. Id. (citing Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 770 (1981); Trans-
america Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-77 (1979)).
55. See Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 575-77; Lampf, 501 U.S. at 365-66 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
56. Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77 (1981) (finding that
an employer has no right to contribution against unions alleged to be joint participants
with the employer in violations of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964); Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981) (finding
no right to contribution for recovery based on § 1 of the Sherman Act).
57. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2088. The argument against the creation of a federal common
law right to contribution from the Court's recent cases "would have much force were the
1996]
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inconsistency with the Court's decisions rejecting such actions absent con-
gressional intent,58 the Court believed it "must confront the law in its
current form, '59 in the "present context, '60 and in the "present state of
the jurisprudence we consider here."' 61 According to the Court, it is the
unique judicial origin of the private section 10(b) remedy that gives it the
judicial power to define "the contours" 62 of the remedy by creating a
right to contribution. 63
The Court's stated reasoning, however, confounds logic and constitu-
tional principles. The Court asserted that because the section 10(b) pri-
vate right of action has questionable judicial origins, the federal courts
may exercise more power than otherwise proper to create an additional
right of action for contribution. The Court acknowledged that when the
federal courts properly interpret and apply private remedies expressly
created by Congress, they have no constitutional power to expand their
jurisdiction by creating a federal common law right to contribution.64
The Court argued, however, that if the federal courts first have exceeded
their constitutional power by creating an underlying cause of action for
the violation of a federal statute, they may further exceed their constitu-
tional power by creating an additional private right to contribution. 65
This reasoning is nothing other than a sophisticated version of the argu-
ment that "two wrongs make a right." The initial constitutional error in
creating a section 10(b) private remedy is used to justify a second consti-
tutional error in creating a section 10(b) right to contribution.
Apparently recognizing the logical and constitutional flaws in this argu-
ment, the Supreme Court attempted to support its newly created section
10(b) right to contribution by appealing alternatively to legislative acqui-
escence.66 The Court contends that recent congressional references to
the section 10(b) private right of action 67 indicate not only congressional
approval of that action, but also a broad delegation to the judiciary of
power over its formulation. 68
The Court's reliance on legislative acquiescence, however, is unavail-
ing. As the Supreme Court itself declared in Central Bank, legislative
duty to be created one governing conduct subject to liability under an express remedial
provision fashioned by Congress, or one governing conduct not already subject to liability
through private suit." Id.
58. Id. at 2087-89.
59. Id. at 2089.
60. Id. at 2088.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 2089 (quoting Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083 (1991)).
63. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2091-92.
64. Id. at 2087-88 (citing with approval Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 91, 97; Texas
Indus., 451 U.S. at 642).
65. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2088.
66. Id. at 2089 (citing Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,384-86 (1983);
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 378-82 (1982).
67. 113 S. Ct. at 2089 (citing the Insider rading and Securities Fraud Enforcement
Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1994)).
68. Id.
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acquiescence is not a valid basis for the judicial creation of a private stat-
utory remedy.69 Thus, the acquiescence doctrine is based on unfounded
assumptions about congressional inaction. 70 More significantly, the doc-
trine upsets the constitutionally-mandated separation of legislative and
judicial powers. It permits the judiciary to treat congressional inaction as
a legislative enactment and to knowingly maintain an erroneous interpre-
tation of the intent of the enacting Congress.71 Even in the context of
legislative responses to judicial interpretations of section 10(b), legislative
acquiescence provides no legitimate constitutional basis for maintaining
the private right of action in the face of the contrary intent of the enact-
ing Congress. 72
When the Court in Musick employed the legislative acquiescence doc-
trine to justify its power to create a right to contribution, it compounded
these constitutional difficulties. The Court inferred from congressional
"references" to section 10(b) not only congressional approval of a Court
decision, but also a broad delegation from Congress of judicial power to
continue to fashion the section 10(b) remedy, including the power to
fashion additional rights of action such as those for contribution.
The Court's interpretation of congressional "references" to section
10(b), however, lacks support. The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988 preserves implied remedies; it does not ex-
pressly or implicitly delegate any judicial power to the federal courts.73
To the contrary, this statute expressly limits the traditional judicial power
to construe statutory remedies in an exclusive mannei. 74 Similarly, sec-
tion 27A vitiates the retroactive effect of the Supreme Court's decision in
Lampf to create a uniform statute of limitations period for section 10(b)
claims. 75 It does so, however, by expressly granting to the federal courts
jurisdiction over only one, unique category of section 10(b) claims.76
Contrary to the Court's inference, this stop-gap provision does not
"avoid[ ] entangling Congress" in the formulation of the statute of limita-
tions issue.77 By limiting federal court jurisdiction to only one category
of section 10(b) claims, this provision flatly rejects the Court's prior work.
Any inference that Congress has acquiesced to the Court's power to for-
mulate section 10(b), therefore, is contrary to fact.
In Musick, the Court did not argue that legislative acquiescence sup-
ports the right to contribution, recognizing that there is no clear judicial
69. See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1452-53.
70. Id See also Michael J. Kaufman, A Little "Right" Musick: The Unconstitutional
Judicial Creation of Private Rights of Action under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 287, 324-29 (1994).
71. Id.
72. Id at 329-35.
73. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(d) (1994).
74. Id.
75. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (1994).
76. See discussion infra Part V.
77. See Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2089.
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authority or line of authority recognizing such an implied right.78 In-
stead, the Court asserted that Congress has acquiesced in its power to
decide such matters as whether to create an implied right to contribution
under section 10(b).79 The Court assumed that neither section 10(b) nor
the general congressional grant of "arising under" subject matter jurisdic-
tion80 expressly or impliedly confers this power to the federal courts. 81
Nonetheless, because the federal courts have exercised that power and
because Congress has not acted to remove that power, the Court inferred
that Congress approves of the judicial use of that power.82 This argument
improperly elevates the inaction of non-enacting Congresses over the in-
tent of the enacting Congress.
Neither legislative acquiescence nor the unique judicial origins of the
section 10(b) private remedy can authorize the Court to "define the 'con-
tours' " of that remedy by creating new rights of action.83 Even where
the federal courts interpret and apply express statutory remedies, they
undoubtedly have the power "to define the contours ... and to flesh out
those remedies." 84 But, as even the Musick Court acknowledged,85 this
power does not extend to the creation of new rights of action. When it
determined whether a right to contribution is within the contours of the
implied section 10(b) remedy, the Court expanded the notion of statutory
contours beyond recognition. The Court concluded that the contours of
section 10(b) are broad enough to encompass a contribution action.86
Yet the Court did not search for the right to contribution within the con-
tours of section 10(b). 87 The Court instead inferred from analogous ex-
press rights to contribution in the 1934 Act 88 that Congress, had it created
a section 10(b) private right of action, would have also created a corre-
sponding right to contribution.89 At this point, however, the Court was
no longer exercising its power to "round out" the scope of statutory lan-
guage; instead, it was writing into the federal securities laws a private
right of action for contribution that is not within the contours of section
10(b) itself and is not part of the congressional scheme.
78. Id. at 2087-88.
79. Id. at 2089.
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
81. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2088-89.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2089 (quoting Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1104
(1991)).
84. Id. (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975)).
See also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 745 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting)("the federal judiciary necessarily exercises substantial powers to construe legislation, in-
cluding, when appropriate, the power to prescribe substantive standards of conduct that
supplement federal legislation").
85. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2088 (citing Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 91, 97; Texas
Indus., 451 U.S. at 642).
86. 113 S. Ct. at 2090-91.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 2090 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78r (1988)).
89. See id.
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The Court's reliance upon the presumed intent of Congress in enacting
the 1934 Act to support its creation of an implied right to contribution
was ironically misplaced. The Court initially justified its power to create
the remedy by arguing that whether or not Congress in 1934 intended to
create a section 10(b) private remedy, post-enactment Congresses have
acquiesced in its power to create and continue to fill out the contours of
the section 10(b) private action. 90 When the Court filled out those con-
tours, however, it suddenly returned to the intent of the enacting Con-
gress. 91 The irony is that the Court freely acknowledged that the enacting
Congress did not intend to create the section 10(b) private right of ac-
tion,92 did not intend to create any section 10(b) right to contribution, 93
and did not expressly empower the federal courts to do so.94
b. Musick's Appearance of Result-Guided Reasoning
By the light of the dubious Musick reasoning, the shadow of result-
guided reasoning appeared. Unlike most of its prior decisions limiting
the reach of the section 10(b) private action, the Supreme Court in Mu-
sick appeared to extend the scope of that private action.95 Ultimately,
however, all of the Supreme Court's arguments in Musick hinge on its
concern for defendants threatened with securities fraud liability: "Having
implied the underlying liability in the first place, to now disavow any au-
thority to allocate it on the theory that Congress has not addressed the
issue would be most unfair to those against whom damages are
assessed. '96
Hence, in the Supreme Court's previous decisions limiting the scope of
section 10(b), the Court argued that the private remedy's unique judicial
origins mandate a narrow construction.97 In Musick, however, the Court
argued that these unique judicial origins justify the expanded use of judi-
cial power to create a new private action for contribution.98 On the one
hand, the Court used the judicial origins of section 10(b) to justify a con-
traction of federal judicial power. On the other hand, it used those ori-
gins to justify an expansion of federal judicial power.
This inconsistency is not irreconcilable. But the point of reconciliation
in these Supreme Court section 10(b) decisions appears to be the Court's
90. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2088-89.
91. Id. at 2089-90 (citing Lampf, 501 U.S. at 359).
92. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 358-59.
93. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2090.
94. Id.
95. Most, if not all, of the Supreme Court's recent decisions interpreting § 10(b) limit
rather than expand the scope of the private right of action. See supra Part II.
96. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2088. This is the same sort of fairness argument made by
Justice Scalia in Lampf. 501 U.S. at 364 (Scalia, J., concurring). There, Justice Scalia as-
serted that absent a congressionally mandated statute of limitations period for § 10(b), "no
limitations period exists." Id at 364. Scalia declined to follow this principled result, how-
ever, because it would be "highly unjust to those who must litigate past inventions." Id. at
365.
97. See supra Part I.
98. See Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2089.
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almost unwavering protection of defendants threatened with securities
fraud liability. The Court has limited the reach of the section 10(b) pri-
vate remedy by arguing that the remedy's judicial origins give it no power
to expand the congressional scheme. The Court also has created a contri-
bution right by arguing that the remedy's judicial origins give the Court
special power to do so.
2. Central Bank: The Supreme Court's Rejection of An Implied Right
of Action for Aiding and Abetting
a. The Central Bank Decision
In Central Bank,99 the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that a
"private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit under
§ 10(b)."'100 There, purchasers of public improvement bonds alleged that
Central Bank had aided and abetted primary violations of section 10(b)
committed by the issuer, the developers, the underwriters, and a member
of the developer's board of directors. 101 Central Bank allegedly accom-
plished this by agreeing to delay its independent review of an outdated
appraisal of the property securing the bonds. Although the lower federal
courts had recognized an implied right of action for aiding and abetting
section 10(b) violations, the Supreme Court concluded that no such cause
of action should exist. 10 2
Writing for the Supreme Court's narrow majority, Justice Kennedy be-
gan his opinion by attempting to segregate two lines of Supreme Court
section 10(b) cases: (1) those where the Court has "determined the scope
of conduct prohibited by § 10(b)"' 0 3 and (2) those where the Court has
decided questions about the "elements of the 10b-5 private liability
scheme."' 0 4 In the latter category of cases, the absence of any express
right of action for violations of section 10(b) has required the Court to
"infer how the 1934 Congress would have addressed the issues" if that
Congress had provided an express right of action. 10 5 In the first category
of cases, however, the Court suggested that the text of the statute alone
has guided its prior decisions.'0 6
Because, according to the Court, the issue of the existence of a private
aiding and abetting claim involves the scope of the conduct prohibited by
section 10(b), that question must be resolved by the text of the statute
alone. 07 After reaching the "uncontroversial conclusion"' 0 8 that the text
99. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
100. hi. at 1455.
101. Id. at 1443.
102. Id. at 1444.
103. Idt at 1445.
104. It
105. Id. at 1446 (quoting Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2089).
106. Id
107. Id at 1448.
108. Id.
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of the 1934 Act does not create a private aiding and abetting claim, the
Court found that no such private remedy should exist. 109
Although the Court declared that the absence of any textual support
for the private aiding and abetting claim is dispositive, 110 it nonetheless
proceeded to buttress its conclusion by noting that "none of the express
causes of action in the 1934 Act further imposes liability on one who aids
or abets a violation.""' In addition, the Court flatly rejected the legisla-
tive acquiescence doctrine so prominent in Musick." 2 The Court held
that the congressional intent to create a private remedy for aiding and
abetting section 10(b) violations cannot be inferred from the silence of
the 1934 Congress or from subsequent congressional inaction. 1 3 The
Court then offered that the statutory purposes of the 1934 Act may be
disserved by aiding and abetting liability, which exacts "costs" on secon-
dary participants in the securities industry."14 Finally, the Court found
that although 18 U.S.C. § 2 creates criminal liability for any person who
aids and abets any violation of any federal statute, including section
10(b), this statutory provision should not be construed to create civil
liability.115
b. Central Bank's Appearance of Result-Guided Reasoning
Apparently aware that in some section 10(b) cases it appeared to em-
brace a strict textual approach, while in others it attempted to divine what
the 1934 Congress might have written into the securities laws, the Court
in Central Bank purported to find a key distinction between its prior
cases. 116 According to the Court, where the scope of prohibited conduct
was at issue, the Court limited itself to the text of the 1934 Act. 117 By
contrast, wherever the Court addressed the "elements" of "private liabil-
ity," the Court inferred how the 1934 Congress would have addressed the
issue had the section 10(b) private action been expressly included. 118
This distinction drove the Court's entire analysis in Central Bank.
The cases cited by the Court do not support this distinction. The Court
suggested that because Dirks,119 Aaron,120 Chiarella,'2' Santa Fe122 and
Hochfelder 23 were all cases which involved the scope of conduct prohib-
ited by section 10(b), as opposed to the elements of private liability, it
109. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1455.
110. Id. at 1448.
111. Id. at 1449.
112. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2089.
113. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1452-53.
114. Id at 1454.
115. Id. at 1455.
116. Itt at 1445-47.
117. Id. at 1446.
118. Id at 1445-46 (citing Musick, 113 S. Ct. 2085, 2090).
119. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
120. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
121. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
122. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
123. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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was constrained by the text of the statute.124 Santa Fe and Hochfelder,
however, do not fit this mold. They were both actions in which the Court
attempted to define the elements of civil liability under section 10(b). 125
Furthermore, in Chiarella and Dirks, in which the Court addressed crimi-
nal and civil insider trading and tippee liability, the text of section 10(b)
was not dispositive. 126 Rather, the Court, particularly in Dirks, fashioned
its own rules of liability based on a balancing of competing policy objec-
tives. 127 Hence, the Court's purported distinction is illusory.
The irreconcilability of Central Bank with prior Supreme Court cases
interpreting section 10(b) raises anew the appearance of result-guided
reasoning. Indeed, the Central Bank case appears to be dramatically in-
consistent with Musick. Ultimately, the Musick Court created a new pri-
vate right to contribution because to do otherwise "would be most unfair
to those against whom damages are assessed."'1 28 In particular, the Court
reasoned that although the "creation of new rights ought to be left to
legislatures, not courts,"1 29 that rule of judicial restraint does not apply
where the right to be created governs conduct already "subject to liability
through private suit.' 130 Furthermore, the Musick Court found support
for creating a right to contribution from congressional acquiescence in
the Court's power over the full "formulation" of the section 10(b) private
remedy.' 31
Each of these arguments regarding the power of the federal judiciary,
however, was flatly rejected by the Supreme Court in Central Bank.
There, the Court argued that it has no power to create an additional pri-
vate remedy despite the fact that the private right of action for aiding and
abetting section 10(b) violations involves conduct already the subject of
private suit. The Court also warned that, despite the universal judicial
acceptance of the private right of action for aiding and abetting, and de-
spite the fact that Congress had revisited section 10(b) on a number of
occasions, any argument that Congress had acquiesced in the judicial cre-
ation of that right of action is erroneous.1 32 The Court in fact launched
into a diatribe against theories of congressional re-enactment, amend-
ment by silence, and legislative acquiescence: "It is impossible to assert
with any degree of assurance that congressional failure to act represents
affirmative congressional approval of the [Court's] statutory interpreta-
124. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1445-46.
125. Sante Fe, 430 U.S. at 464 (addressing whether § 10(b) civil liability extends to fi-
nancial unfairness); Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 197 (addressing whether § 10(b) civil liability
requires scienter).
126. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235 (holding that material nondisclosure could not constitute
§ 10(b) liability absent a duty to disclose by analogy to common law); Dirks, 463 U.S. at
658 (defining tippee liability by reference to policy arguments regarding salutary functions
of market analysts).
127. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658-59.
128. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2088.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 2089.
132. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1452-53.
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tion .... ,"133 While the Court in Musick employed doctrines of legislative
acquiescence and federal remedial power, the Court in Central Bank re-
jected these same theories. In its refusal to create an implied right of
action for aiding and abetting, the Court completely rejected the very
arguments it employed in Musick to justify creating the implied right of
action for contribution.
The only difference between the Court's decisions in these cases ap-
pears to be the result. Ultimately, in Central Bank, the Court decided not
to create a private right of action because it would be detrimental to the
same type of defendants helped by the implied right to contribution.1
3 4
In Central Bank, the Court even expressly acknowledged its consistent
policy of protecting defendants from exposure to securities fraud litiga-
tion when it stated: "[L]itigation under Rule 10b-5 presents a danger of
vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from that which accompa-
nies litigation in general. '135
III. ALLOYD AND PLAUT: THE COURT'S UNPRINCIPLED
REJECTION OF EXPRESS REMEDIES FOR
SECURITIES FRAUD
A. ALLOYD'S UNPRINCIPLED REJECTION OF EXPRESS REMEDIES FOR
SECURITIES FRAUD
1. The Alloyd Decision
In Alloyd, 136 the Supreme Court held that section 12(2) 137 of the Secur-
ities Act of 1933138 ("the 1933 Act") does not apply to a private, secon-
dary sale of securities because a sales contract that is not held out to the
public cannot be a prospectus covered by that provision.139 The share-
133. It at 1453 (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 n.1
(1989)).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1454 (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739
(1975)).
136. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061 (1995).
137. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2)(1994). Section 12(2) provides that any person who:
(2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the provisions of
section 77c of this title, other than paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of said
section), by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or commu-
nication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or
oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or
omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading
(the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not
sustain the burden of proof that he did know, and in the exercise of reason-
able care could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable
to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law
or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the considera-
tion paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any in-
come received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he
no longer owns the security.
138. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1994).
139. Alloyd, 115 S. Ct. at 1073-74.
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holders of Alloyd, Inc. ("Alloyd") sold substantially all of Alloyd's stock
to a group of investors comprising Wind Point Partners, II, L.P. ("Wind
Point"). 140 Before the sale, Wind Point conducted an extensive investiga-
tion into the seller's business, relying partially on a review of Alloyd's
financial statements performed by KPMG Peat Marwick ("KPMG").
The parties executed a sales contract which provided that Wind Point
would pay $18,709,000 for the Alloyd shares, and an additional $2,122,219
that represented an estimated increase in Alloyd's net worth from the
previous reported year.141 In the contract, the seller expressly warranted
that the company's financial statements "present fairly.., the Company's
financial condition" and that "no material adverse change" in Alloyd's
financial condition had occurred "between the date of the latest balance
sheet and the date the agreement was executed."'1 42
The succeeding year-end audit of Alloyd, however, disclosed that it's
actual earnings were in fact lower than the estimates relied upon by the
parties in negotiating the $2,122,219 adjustment. Accordingly, the buyers
brought an action in federal court under section 12(2) seeking rescission
of the sale of securities. 143 The buyers claimed that because the contract
for the sale of securities was a prospectus that contained material mis-
statements and omissions regarding the company's financial condition,
they were entitled to rescind the contract without showing scienter, reli-
ance, causation, or even actual damages.144
The district court disagreed, and granted summary judgment for Al-
loyd. The court cited Ballay145 for the proposition that "section 12(2)
claims can only arise out of the initial stock offerings.' 46 The district
court further reasoned that the private sales contract could not be analo-
gized to an initial offering because "the purchasers in this case had direct
access to financial and other company documents, and had the opportu-
nity to inspect the seller's property."'1 47
The Seventh Circuit, however, reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment. That court relied on its own intervening decision in
Pacific Dunlop148 for the view that because the 1933 Act defines the term
prospectus broadly to include any written communication, the contract of
sale in this case was plainly within the scope of section 12(2). 149 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether section 12(2) "ex-
140. Id. at 1064.
141. Id. at 1064-65.
142. Id. at 1065.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 820 (1991).
146. Alloyd, 115 S. Ct. at 1065 (summarizing the case's procedural history).
147. Id. (quoting Ballay, 925 F.2d at 688-90).
148. Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1993), cert.
granted, 114 S. Ct. 907, and cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 1146 (1994).
149. Alloyd, 115 S. Ct. at 1065.
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tends to a private, secondary transaction, on the theory that recitations in
the purchase agreement are part of a 'prospectus.' -15o
2. Alloyd's Result-Guided Reasoning
That the Court's reasoning in Alloyd is result-guided is evidenced by
the Court's: (1) lack of legitimate arguments supporting its result;151 (2)
inconsistent use of principles of statutory construction; 152 and (3) admis-
sion that its decision is guided by its policy objective of limiting defend-
ants' exposure to private actions seeking the rescission of settled
securities transactions. 153
a. The Court's Arguments Are Unpersuasive
In holding that section 12(2) does not extend to a private, secondary
securities transaction, the Court, in a 5-4 decision written by Justice Ken-
nedy, undertook a linguistic and structural analysis of the 1933 Act. The
analysis yielded five basic arguments, each with significant flaws.
First, the Court contended that the term "prospectus" in section 12(2)
must have the same meaning as "prospectus" in section 10 of the 1933
Act. The Court observed that section 10 of the 1933 Act provides that,
subject to "explicit and well-defined exemptions for securities listed
under § 3 [of the 1933 Act], a prospectus. . . shall contain the information
contained in the registration statement."'1 54 The Court reasoned that be-
cause the sales contract at issue in the case did not have to contain the
information in a registration statement, it "follows that the contract is not
a prospectus under § 10."'155 The Court concluded that a "prospectus
under § 10 is confined to documents related to public offerings by an is-
suer or its controlling shareholders.' '1 56
Having defined the requirements for a prospectus under section 10, the
Court contended that the "term 'prospectus' must have the same mean-
ing under §§ 10 and 12" because "identical words used in different parts
of the same act are intended to have the same meaning."'1 57 The Court
found no evidence to rebut its presumption that the term prospectus as
used in section 10 should mean the same thing as when the term is used in
section 12(2).158
The Court's entire argument, however, is circular and incomplete. The
argument is circular because it selects section 10 as the starting point for
defining a prospectus and then proceeds on the assumption that all other
uses of that term in the 1933 Act mean what that term means in section
150. Id. at 1064.
151. See discussion infra subsection III.A.2.a.
152. See discussion infra subsection III.A.2.b.
153. See discussion infra subsection III.A.2.c.
154. Alloyd, 115 S. Ct. at 1066 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1994)).
155. Id. at 1067. The Court also indicates that the meaning of § 10 is not in dispute. Id.
156. Id.




10. The circularity of this analysis can be seen by supposing that the
Court had begun its analysis with section 2(10) of the 1933 Act instead of
section 10. Section 2(10) defines "prospectus" as "any prospectus, notice,
circular, advertisement, letter, or communication, written or by radio or
television" that offers any security for sale or confirms its sale. 159 If, as
the Court asserted, the term prospectus must have the same meaning in
every provision of the 1933 Act, then by its own reasoning this definition
of prospectus in section 2(10) must be squared with the use of that same
term in sections 10 and 12(2). That reconciliation is not difficult. Section
10, as the Court noted, describes the information that must be included in
a "prospectus." Yet, a full reading of section 10 indicates that the infor-
mation that must be included in a prospectus varies according to the
circumstances.
As a rule, a prospectus must include the "information contained in the
registration statement.' 160 But this rule presumes that there is a registra-
tion statement. When the issuer must file a registration statement, that
issuer must include within "a" prospectus the information contained in
"the" registration statement.161
Yet, section 10(a) itself provides exceptions to the required content of a
prospectus. For example, if a prospectus is used more than nine months
after the registration statement's effective date, the information in the
prospectus must, if practicable, be current (and perhaps different from
the information in the registration statement) within sixteen months of its
use.' 62 More significantly, section 10 gives the SEC power to promulgate
rules or regulations which allow the omission from a prospectus of any
information otherwise required by section 10.163 Moreover, the SEC is
empowered to permit the use of a prospectus that omits or summarizes
the information otherwise required in section 10 for the purpose of selling
a security while waiting for the effective date.164 Section 10 also autho-
rizes the SEC to require additional information in "[a]ny prospectus" and
to "classify prospectuses.' 165 In addition, that section makes it clear that
the information required in a prospectus need not be in writing,166 and
may consist of radio or television broadcasts. 167
Section 10, fairly read, thus indicates what information must be in-
cluded in various forms of prospectuses; yet, it does not define prospectus
at all. Nor does section 10 genuinely limit a prospectus to documents that
contain the information in a registration statement. The section provides
159. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1994).
160. Id. § 77j(a)(1).
161. Id. (emphasis added).
162. Id. § 77j(a)(3).
163. Id. § 77j(a)(4).
164. Id. § 77j(b).
165. Id. §§ 77j(c)-77j(d).
166. See id. § 77j(e). That section provides that the information in a prospectus "when
written," must be conspicuous. (emphasis added).
167. 15 U.S.C. § 77j(f) (1994).
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only that where a registration statement has been filed, "a" prospectus
must generally include most of the information in that statement. 168
If the Court had begun its analysis with section 2(10), which actually
defines prospectus, it could have readily squared that definition with this
fair reading of section 10. The 1933 Act defines prospectus broadly to
include "any communication" precisely because Congress envisioned
many different forms of selling documents. For offerings governed by the
registration requirements in section 5 of the 1933 Act, Congress makes
clear in section 10 that any prospectus must include most of the informa-
tion in "the" registration statement that has been filed. Yet, in situations
where such a registration statement need not be filed, section 10 makes
equally clear that other prospectuses may not have to include such infor-
mation. Section 10, in complete harmony with section 2(10), recognizes
that many different types of prospectuses exist, each with its own content
requirements.
Defining the term "prospectus" broadly in section 2(10), to include any
selling instrument, is consistent with section 10's various content require-
ments for specific types of selling instruments. The meaning of "prospec-
tus" in section 2(10), therefore, is identical to its meaning as used in
section 10. Section 10 merely indicates the information requirements for
various types of selling instruments.
Congress's use of the term "prospectus" in section 12(2) is consistent
with both its definition of that term in section 2(10) and the informational
requirements of section 10. Section 12(2) provides a cause of action for
material misrepresentations or omissions in "a prospectus,"'169 even if the
security sold is fully exempt from the registration statement requirements
of sections 5 or 10.170 A prospectus used in connection with the sale of
securities that are exempt from the 1933 Act's registration statement re-
quirements cannot, by definition, include information contained in the
registration statement. Therefore, section 12(2) necessarily governs sales
of securities using a prospectus that does not, and need not, include such
registration statement information. Only by defining "prospectus" (as
"any selling instrument" as Congress defines it in section 2(10)) may that
term truly have a consistent meaning throughout the 1933 Act. If the
Court had begun its analysis with section 2(10), it would have readily
reached a consistent meaning for the term "prospectus" throughout the
Act.
Instead, the Court fashioned an identical meaning to the term "pro-
spectus" only by offering an admittedly incomplete view of section 10. In
its interpretation of section 10, the Court first acknowledged the full
range of meanings for the term "prospectus," and then disregarded the
full meaning for the remainder of its opinion. Initially, the Court used
168. Id.
169. Id. § 771(2).
170. Id. § 771(2) (1994).
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the following phrases to qualify its view of a prospectus:171 "whatever else
'prospectus' may mean"; "[b]y and large"; and, "absent an overriding ex-
emption."'1 72 This qualifying language is an admission that a prospectus
does not always require the information contained in a registration state-
ment. Still, the Court disregarded its own qualifying language when it
concluded that, despite the variety of prospectuses recognized by Con-
gress, "a prospectus under § 10 is confined to documents related to public
offerings by an issuer or its controlling shareholders.' 1 73
Second, and equally unsatisfying, the Court contended that the "struc-
ture" of the 1933 Act confirms its interpretation. According to the Court,
section 12(2) liability flows from the obligation to distribute a prospectus,
just like section 11 liability flows from the obligation to file a registration
statement. 174 The Court asserted that section 12(2)'s self-contained ex-
emption for government-issued securities buttresses its view that the sec-
tion does not apply to a private contract for the sale of securities. 175 The
Court reasoned that Congress intended to grant immunity to the govern-
ment for government-issued securities, but not to subsequent private sell-
ers of government-issued securities. 176 The Court also asserted that
section 12(2) should be interpreted as a method of enforcing the "new
substantive obligations" created by the 1933 Act, which "for the most
part" are limited to registration and disclosure requirements connected to
public offerings. 177
But the 1933 Act is not even "for the most part" limited to public offer-
ings. Clearly the registration requirements of section 5 are limited to
public offerings, but the liability provisions are not. As the Court itself
conceded, section 17(a) of the 1933 Act regulates fraud in the sale of
securities.178 However, there is no distinct disclosure obligation linked to
section 17(a). In fact, if the 1933 Act is generally concerned with any-
thing, it is selling securities. The disclosure obligations apply to selling
stock. 179 Each of the antifraud provisions governs the selling process:
section 11 regulates material misstatements and omissions on a registra-
tion statement used to sell securities; 80 section 12(2) regulates material
misstatements and omissions in any selling document;181 and section
17(a) regulates all manipulative and deceptive devices used in the selling
process. 182 In light of the 1933 Act's regulation of all materials used in
the process of selling securities, the Court's claim that the Act's structure




175. Id. at 1067-68.
176. Id. at 1068.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1070 (citing United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 777-78 (1979)).
179. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994).
180. Id. § 77k.
181. Id. § 771(2).
182. Id. § 77q(a).
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supports its view that section 12(2) must be limited to selling only in the
public offering context cannot withstand scrutiny.
Third, the Court unpersuasively asserted that section 2(10) of the 1933
Act, which defines "prospectus," supports its result. That section pro-
vides: "the [t]erm 'prospectus' means any prospectus, notice, circular, ad-
vertisement, letter, or communication, written or by radio or television,
which offers any security for sale or confirms the sale of any security."'1 83
Although the word "communication" itself seems broad enough to in-
clude the private sales agreement at issue in the case, the Court asserted
that two "sensible rules of statutory construction" preclude reading that
word in isolation. 184 An interpretation of "communication" that includes
any written communication would improperly render the accompanying
terms such as notice, circular, or letter "altogether redundant.' 185 More-
over, interpreting "communication" to include nonpublic communica-
tions ignores the principle that a word must be known by the company
that it keeps, since the terms accompanying "communication" in section
2(10) together suggest methods of public solicitation to acquire securi-
ties. 186 According to the Court, because the list of methods of communi-
cation in section 2(10) "refers to documents of wide dissemination," the
inclusion of the term "communication" in that list refers to a widely dis-
seminated (public) communication as well. 187
The Court's contention that the definition of prospectus in section
2(10) of the 1933 Act supports its view that a prospectus is limited to
"documents of wide dissemination" borders on the disingenuous.' 8 The
plain language of the Act defines "prospectus" to include not only "any
prospectus," but also any "notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or com-
munication.' 89 Interpreting the word "communication" to be its com-
mon meaning would not, as the Court suggests, render the accompanying
terms within the definition "altogether redundant."'190 While the term
"communication" is broad enough to include prospectus, notice, circular,
advertisement, and letter, it is actually broader than each of these accom-
panying terms. Congress provided examples of the different types of
communications that are included within its definition of prospectus and
also was careful to include the catch-all term "communication" within its
definition. Congress's examples are forms of offering documents typi-
cally used when Congress enacted the 1933 Act. The additional catch-all
term "communication" simply ensures that any new forms of offering
documents will not escape the reach of the securities laws. The word
183. Alloyd, 115 S. Ct. at 1069 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10)).
184. Id.
185. Id. (citing United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955)).
186. Id. at 1069-70 (citing Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961); Reves
v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63 (1990)).
187. Alloyd, 115 S. Ct. at 1070.
188. Id.
189. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1994).
190. Alloyd, 115 S. Ct. at 1069 (citing Menasche, 348 U.S. at 538-39).
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"communication," therefore, is not redundant; it makes clear that the list
of known offering documents is not exhaustive.
Nor does interpreting "communication" in light of the accompanying
list of offering documents support the Court's definition of prospectus.
The terms "notice," "circular," and "advertisement" may suggest widely-
disseminated documents. By no stretch of the imagination, however,
does the word "letter" indicate a document of wide dissemination. To the
contrary, Congress's inclusion of "letter, or communication" within its
definition of "prospectus" indicates that a "prospectus" includes offering
material that is not widely disseminated.
It is the Court's interpretation of section 2(10) that renders the con-
gressional language meaningless. If, as the Court claimed, "prospectus"
means only documents of wide dissemination, then the words "letter" and
"communication" not only become mere surplusage, they become mean-
ingless. Indeed, they are effectively eviscerated from the statute.
Fourth, the Court mistakenly tried to buttress its interpretation of the
language in the 1933 Act with recognized definitions of "prospectus" at
the time Congress drafted that statute. The Court suggested that the
term prospectus was a "term of art" meaning a document of "wide dis-
semination" published by a company "inviting the public to subscribe to
the issue."' 91 In this context, Congress's inclusion of "communication" in
its definition of "prospectus" was meant to preclude an issuer from evad-
ing regulations merely by titling a widely-disseminated document inviting
the public to purchase its shares something other than a "prospectus.' '1 92
The Court's argument that in 1933 "prospectus" was a "term of art"
meaning documents of wide dissemination, however, actually further ren-
ders the congressional language defining "prospectus" meaningless. Con-
gress defined "prospectus" to mean not only any "prospectus," but also
any "letter, or communication." If, as the Court insists, "prospectus" was
a "term of art" in 1933 meaning a public offering document, then it is
clear that Congress intended to create a statutory definition of prospectus
that was far broader than the recognized street meaning of that term.
The statutory definition includes among its examples of the term "pro-
spectus" the word "prospectus" itself. The inclusion of the word "pro-
spectus" in a definition of prospectus would be not only bizarre, it would
be redundant if the statutory definition of prospectus were limited to the
recognized street definition of that term. If, on the other hand, the statu-
tory definition of prospectus means something other than the street defi-
nition of prospectus, then Congress's inclusion of "prospectus" within the
definition makes perfect sense. Congress tries to make clear that its stat-
utory definition not only includes the well-recognized forms of widely dis-
seminated offering materials in use at the time, it also includes any letter
or communication used to sell securities. The argument that "prospec-
191. Id. at 1070 (citing BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 959 (2d ed. 1910); 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(10); H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1933)).
192. Id.
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tus" was a term of art when Congress drafted the 1933 Act, therefore,
actually undercuts the Court's narrow reading of section 2(10).
Fifth, the Court argued that its prior Naftalin193 decision, interpreting
section 17(a) of the 1933 Act' 94 to extend beyond public offerings, sup-
ports its restriction of section 12(2) to public offerings. Unlike section
12(2), the Court insisted, neither the language nor the legislative history
of section 17(a) suggests that Congress intended to limit the latter provi-
sion to public offerings. 195 According to the Court in Alloyd, in the ab-
sence of evidence limiting the scope of section 17(a), the Court in
Naftalin correctly interpreted that section as an exceptional general an-
tifraud provision. "[T]he presence of limiting language in § 12(2)," the
Alloyd Court reasoned, requires a proportionately "narrow
construction."1 96
The Court's effort to reconcile Naftalin with its Alloyd holding is un-
availing. If, as the Court argued, section 12(2) had "limiting language,"
then the holding in Naftalin regarding very different language in section
17(a) would be entirely consistent with the Court's holding in Alloyd.
Yet, section 12(2) does not have any such limiting language. In addition,
Naftalin's principles are inconsistent with Alloyd in two respects. Naftalin
demonstrated that the 1933 Act extends its antifraud protections beyond
documents of wide dissemination. It also demonstrated that those pro-
tections need not be rooted in a specific statutory disclosure obligation.
Naftalin, therefore, at best is irrelevant to the Court's analysis of section
12(2), and at worst is inconsistent with that analysis. Nothing in Naftalin
affirmatively supports the Court's Alloyd holding.
b. The Court's Principles of Statutory Construction Are Consistent
Only in Result
The Court's method of statutory interpretation is driven by its desired
result. The Supreme Court repeatedly has declared in its securities fraud
opinions that the "starting point in every case involving construction of a
statute is the language itself."'1 97 The Court adhered to that canon of stat-
utory construction to limit the section 10(b) implied right of action to
actual purchasers or sellers of securities, 198 to limit the section 10(b) im-
plied right of action to defendants who act with "scienter,"' 199 and to limit
the section 10(b) implied right of action to primary participants in securi-
ties fraud. 200 Yet, when interpreting the plain language of the definition
of prospectus, which clearly favors an expansion of securities fraud liabil-
193. United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979).
194. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1994).
195. Alloyd, 115 S. Ct. at 1070.
196. Id. at 1071.
197. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J.,
concurring); see also Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1445-47 (1994).
198. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 756.
199. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976).
200. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1445-47.
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ity, the Court in Alloyd abandoned this primary canon of statutory con-
struction. Instead, the Court interpreted the word prospectus by "turning
to sources outside the four corners of the statute."'20 '
The Court's approach to statutory interpretation in Alloyd was mark-
edly different from its approach in Central Bank. In Central Bank, the
Court declared: "If ... Congress intended to impose aiding and abetting
liability, we presume it would have used the words 'aid' and 'abet' in the
statutory text. But it did not."202 In Alloyd, the Court presumed the re-
verse. It presumed that Congress intended to limit its broad definition of
"prospectus" because it failed to use the words "private" or "secondary
transaction" in that definition. 20 3 Yet Congress clearly included the word
"communication" in its definition of prospectus. Following the Central
Bank presumption would have led the Court to conclude that if Congress
did not intend section 12(2) to apply to "any communication," it would
not have used those words at all.
Similarly, in justifying its view that the term "prospectus" should have
identical meanings in sections 12(2), 10, and 2(10) of the 1933 Act, the
Court used a principle of statutory construction that it previously rejected
in limiting the reach of securities fraud remedies. The Alloyd Court's
principle, that identical words used in different parts of the same statute
are intended to have the same meaning,204 is based on its claim that acts
of Congress "should not be read as a series of unrelated and isolated
provisions. '20 5 Yet, the Court has used the opposite view of statutory
construction in order to limit the reach of civil liability for securities
fraud. In Hochfelder, both the private plaintiffs and the SEC argued that
the "interdependence of the various sections of the securities laws"
proves that section 10(b) does not itself require "scienter. ' '20 6 The Court
rejected that argument as based upon a misconception of the significance
of the separate provisions of the securities laws. Instead, the Court in
Hochfelder felt compelled to discuss each of the separate liability provi-
sions of the securities laws, contrasting each with section 10(b). 20 7 The
Court's analysis was predicated on the presumption that the liability pro-
visions of the securities laws are different from each other and must be
interpreted as distinct, isolated statutory units. The Court again adopted
the opposite presumption in Alloyd. There, the Court presumed that sec-
tion 12(2) must be interpreted with, and virtually identical to, the very
different registration provisions housed in section 10.
201. Alloyd, 115 S. Ct. at 1074 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
202. 114 S. Ct. at 1448.
203. 115 S. Ct. at 1069.
204. Id. at 1067 (citing Department of Revenue v. ACF Indus., 114 S. Ct. 843 (1994)).
Even if this rule of statutory construction were absolute, it would not justify the Court's
result. "Prospectus" would have an identical meaning in §§ 10, 2(10), and 12(2) even if the
Court had interpreted it in accord with its clear, broad definition in § 2(10).
205. Id.
206. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 206-07.
207. Id.
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. In addition, as the Court's Hochfelder reasoning indicates, the fact that
the 1933 Act creates obligations in section 5, which are enforced in sec-
tion l's liability provisions, should have had no bearing on its interpreta-
tion of the very different language in section 12(2). The fact that the
other provisions of the 1933 Act are "for the most part" concerned with
registration in a public offering is not a legitimate basis for limiting sec-
tion 12(2) to public offerings.
Similarly, whereas the Alloyd Court relied heavily upon the maxim of
noscitur sociis (a word is known by the company it keeps), the Court has
rejected that maxim in previous securities fraud opinions. 208 In Reves, for
example, the Court refused to define the word "note" in Congress's defi-
nition of "security" 20 9 in accordance with the accompanying broad term
"investment contract." The Court declared: "To hold that a 'note' is not a
'security' unless it meets a test designed for an entirely different variety of
instrument 'would make the Acts' enumeration of many types of instru-
ments superfluous.' "210 Although tenets of statutory construction are
not inflexible, the Court's plainly inconsistent treatment of the same ten-
ets in its recent securities fraud opinions yields the appearance that these
decisions are consistent only in their protection of defendants from expo-
sure to federal securities law liability.
c. Alloyd Is Admittedly Result-Guided
After engaging in its questionable analysis of the language and struc-
ture of the 1933 Act, the Court acknowledged that interpreting "prospec-
tus" to include any communication would have detrimental policy
implications. 21' Any buyer could rescind a securities transaction upon a
showing that the seller, in a "casual communication," omitted a material
fact.212 Despite the fact that Congress drafted section 12(2) to provide
that a rescission action could be maintained with no showing of fraud or
detrimental reliance, the Court was concerned with the expansion of such
a remedy. The Court asserted that the "stability of past transactions"
would be threatened by any interpretation of "prospectus" that includes
every communication used to sell any security.213
The Court's candid statement of its own public policy conceded that its
analysis of the express language of section 12(2) is guided by an ongoing
policy concern that private actions for rescission or rescissory damages
could threaten the "stability" of past transactions. In direct contrast,
when the Court rejected private remedies for aiding and abetting securi-
ties fraud, it reiterated the familiar principle that policy considerations
208. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 64 (1990).
209. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1994).
210. Reves, 494 U.S. at 64 (quoting Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 692(1985)).





"cannot override the Court's interpretation of [an] Act's text and
structure. " 21
4
In the context of its Alloyd opinion, the Court's professed concern for
the "stability" of past transactions is itself anomalous. The Court's opin-
ion has done nothing to lend stability to securities transactions. The
scope of that opinion, in fact, is so ambiguous that it has created little
comfort for issuers of securities in private placements exempt from regis-
tration. While it is unclear from Alloyd whether section 12(2) applies to
offering materials distributed by an issuer in a private placement, there is
a strong argument that such materials still are subject to section 12(2)
liability. Although the Court cast its policy argument in Alloyd in terms
of stabilizing past transactions, the fact that its decision does not engen-
der such stability suggests that the Court is less concerned with stability
than with simply narrowing the reach of Congress's express securities
fraud remedies.
In their dissent from the Court's Alloyd decision, four Justices de-
clared: "I doubt that the majority would read in so narrow and peculiar a
fashion most other statutes, particularly one intended to restrict causes of
action in securities cases. '215 As Justice Thomas declared, "[t]he majority
does not permit Congress to implement its intent unless it does so exactly
as the Court wants it to."'216
B. PLA UT'S UNPRINCIPLED REJECTION OF CONGRESS'S EXPRESS
GRANT OF JURISDICTION OVER A CLASS OF SECTION 10(B)
CLAIMS
In Plaut,217 the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of sec-
tion 27A(b) of the Exchange Act.2 18 Section 27A(b) is Congress's direct
response to the Supreme Court's retroactive application of its opinion in
Lampf to create a uniform federal statute of limitations period for section
10(b) claims.219 The section provides that timely actions in jurisdictions
where they were filed and dismissed as time-barred by retroactive appli-
cation of Lampf may be reinstated by a timely, properly supported
motion.2 20
214. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1442 (citing Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 191
(1991)).
215. Alloyd, 115 S. Ct. at 1079 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
216. Id.
217. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995).
218. Id.
219. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 364 (1991).
On the day that Lampf was decided, the Court also decided James B. Beam Distilling Co.
v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991), in which it held that a new rule of federal law applied by
the Court to the parties before it must also be applied retroactively to all cases pending on
direct review. The impact of Beam was to require that the new 3-year/i-year federal stat-
ute of limitation rule created by the Supreme Court in Lampf be applied retroactively to
all pending cases.
220. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1994).
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In Plaut, the Court held that section 27A(b) represents a "clear viola-
tion" of the Constitution's separation of powers principles to the extent
that it requires federal courts to re-open a final judgment reached before
the statute's enactment. 221 In his opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia
offered no judicial precedent affirmatively supporting the result. Instead,
the opinion relied entirely upon the "record of history," which showed
that the Constitution's grant of federal judicial power in Article III was
designed to give to the federal judicial "department" the exclusive power
to render dispositive judgments in cases over which they have
jurisdiction.222
As the dissent points out, however, the Court's exclusive reliance upon
the "record of history" to support its otherwise unprecedented decision
was misplaced.223 First, the dissent produced a wealth of judicial and leg-
islative precedent supporting the constitutionality of section 27A(b)'s re-
medial design.2 24 Second, the dissent showed that the separation of
powers principle, which precludes Congress from engaging in any case-
by-case review of the merits of individual trial court judgments, is not
genuinely frustrated by section 27A(b). 225 In fact, that section does not
allow for a decision on the merits of an issue in any particular litigation.
Instead, it creates a process by which a federal court may remove a bar-
rier to the judicial resolution of section 10(b) claims on their merits, a
barrier that was created by the Supreme Court itself in Lampf 2 26 Section
27A(b) does not, however, require the judiciary to set aside any final
judgment without condition. Instead, it merely permits a class of litigants
to file a "motion to reinstate" which, like every other motion filed in
court, must be resolved by the judiciary (not Congress) in accordance
with governing law.227 The federal court is free to deny the motion if the
motion is filed in an untimely manner or if the movant fails to demon-
strate the conditions which entitle it to reinstatement under governing
law.228 The decision whether to grant or to deny the motion, if filed at all,
is not made by Congress, but is left to the federal court.229
The acknowledged lack of precedent and settled separation of powers
principles supporting the Court's Plaut decision raises again the appear-
ance of result-guided reasoning. The decision effectively rids the federal
courts of section 10(b) claims of tens of thousands of identified investors
221. Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1449.
222. Id. at 1453-56.
223. Id. at 1473.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1466; see Lampf, 501 U.S. at 364.





who had sought the judicial resolution of the merits of their securities
fraud claims for damages totalling billions of dollars. 230
That result is obtained by the Court only by rejecting the same princi-
ples which it previously used to justify its limitation of securities fraud
remedies. In Lampf, the Court rationalized its judicial creation and ret-
roactive application of a relatively short statute of limitations period by
arguing that the judicial creation of the section 10(b) right of action left it
no choice but to embark upon a lawless act of judicial imagining.231 Ac-
cording to Justice Steven's dissent in Lampf, the fact that section 10(b) is
a judicial creation has two negative results: (1) it allows the Court to
change "four decades" of "established law" regarding the statute of limi-
tations period; and (2) it allows the Court to require the federal courts to
dismiss every pending and future section 10(b) claim not filed within one
year of its discovery and within three years of the challenged transac-
tion.2 32 Justice Stevens also strongly suggested in his dissent that Con-
gress should accept its proper constitutional role and assert more
legislative power in the securities arena.233
Following Lampf, Congress promptly enacted section 27A, creating a
process for federal courts to remedy the harshest retroactive effects of
Lampf. However, when the Court analyzed Congress's power to respond
to the Lampf decision in Plaut, the Court declared: "Lampf as such is
irrelevant to this case. '234 The fact that the statute of limitations period
to which Congress responded was the product of "judicial lawmaking,"
according to the Court, had no bearing on the separation of powers prin-
ciples at issue in Plaut.235
The theoretical scope of Congress's legislative power may not hinge on
these issues. However, there can be no doubt that the bizarre history of
the judicial creation of a retroactive statute of limitations period for a
judicially-created implied right of action has some bearing on separation
of powers principles. The Supreme Court in Lampf had little difficulty
arguing that the very existence of the uncertain judicial origins of implied
rights of action for securities fraud gave it the "legislative" power to de-
fine those rights, and even to create additional supplemental rights of ac-
tion.236 Yet, that same Court in Plaut was unwilling to assign any
relevance to this history of unabashed judicial lawmaking in its interpre-
tation of the scope of the congressional power to respond. 237
When, in section 27A, Congress finally asserted its lawmaking power to
create a remedial process for providing private remedies for thousands of
230. Id. at 1475 n.17. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Hearings on H.R. 3185 Before the
Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-4 (1991)).
231. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 358-61.
232. Id. at 366-68 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
233. Id. at 366-67 (same).
234. Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1458.
235. Id.
236. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 358-61.
237. Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1458.
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alleged victims of securities fraud, the Court rebuked Congress for ex-
ceeding the Court's unprecedented view of the separation of powers. 238
In Plaut, the Court argued that the separation of powers doctrine in the
Constitution is a "structural safeguard," which establishes "high walls and
clear distinctions" between congressional and judicial power.239 The
Plaut majority rejected the dissent's call for "[a]n appropriate regard for
the interdependence of Congress and the judiciary" that can lead to "con-
structive legislative cooperation."240
Yet, in prior cases, such as Lampf, when the Court decided to narrow
the scope of implied rights of action for securities fraud and to legislate
contribution rights as well as federal statute of limitations periods, it ex-
pressly embraced a flexible, cooperative view of the separation of powers
between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, the result of Plaut is that
when Congress legislates in favor of a class of private plaintiffs seeking
relief for securities fraud, the Supreme Court ensures the wall of separa-
tion of powers remains "high." Yet, in cases such as Lampf, when the
Supreme Court rules in favor of defendants threatened with securities
fraud liability, the wall inconsistently evaporates and a flexible, coopera-
tive approach to lawmaking rules the day.
C. THE COURT'S EXPRESS AND IMPLIED SECURITIES FRAUD
REMEDIES DECISIONS ARE CONSISTENT ONLY IN RESULT
As the preceding discussion and Figure 1 show, the only consistency in
the Supreme Court's securities fraud decisions appears to be the Court's
express policy of solicitousness of securities fraud defendants.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S SECURITIES FRAUD POLICIES
HAVE NO EMPIRICAL BASIS
The Court's consistent protection of defendants from securities fraud
exposure has been expressed in the form of two basic policy objectives.
The Court has asserted the following: (1) securities fraud litigation poses
a unique danger of vexatious, non-meritorious litigation; and (2) expo-
sure to such litigation will destabilize settled securities transactions and
otherwise increase their costs so as to chill meritorious securities offer-
ings.241 Neither of these assertions has legitimate support.
First, there is no unique danger of vexatious litigation in the securities
field. Contrary to the emotional claim that there has been an explosion
of securities fraud litigation, the frequency of such litigation is relatively
insignificant. Between 1989 and 1992, an average of 2,358.5 securities and
commodities actions were filed in federal court each year.242 Of these
238. Id. at 1453-56.
239. Id. at 1463.
240. Id. at 1476.
241. See supra Figure 1.
242. Private Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 103d
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2,358.5 actions, 254 were class action SuitS. 2 4 3 These actions include pub-
lic enforcement actions, commodities law actions, and express private ac-
tions for securities fraud. They also include different suits brought
against the same company for related fraud.244 Accordingly, only an av-
erage of 123.5 companies were named as defendants in commodities or
securities fraud class actions in each of those years.245
The incidence of such suits is small when compared to the fact that
approximately 17,400 companies file disclosure documents each year with
the SEC.246 It is particularly small when compared with the fact that in
those same years the total number of annual federal district court filings
averaged 221,498.25.247 The total number of all securities and commodi-
ties actions, therefore, comprised about one percent of all actions filed in
federal court.248 Securities or commodities class actions comprised about
one-tenth of one percent of all actions filed in federal court. 249 This is
hardly an explosion.
Nor is there any genuine support for the contention that securities
fraud claims create a unique danger of vexation because they are settled
regardless of their merit, with a disproportionate share of the proceeds
going to attorneys. As Professor Seligman persuasively has demon-
strated, non-meritorious securities fraud suits are dismissed by defend-
ants at the pleading stage based on motions to dismiss under frequently-
employed existing federal rules and do not reach any type of settle-
ment.250 Furthermore, the best current data available indicates that at-
torney's fees in cases producing settlements between 1991 and 1993
averaged between twenty-eight percent and twenty-nine percent of the
total recovery to investors.251 The possibility of the recovery of such fees
in meritorious securities fraud cases hardly presents a danger of vexatious
litigation any different in degree or kind from other meritorious litigation.
Second, the purported explosion of such claims has not produced any
discernable in terrorem effects on the capital markets. The supposed
danger that enterprises will abandon high-risk ventures because of the
threat of a securities fraud suit is simply not supported by the data.252 To
Cong., 1st Sess. 121 (1994) [hereinafter Hearings] (app. A to testimony of William R.
McLucas, Director, Division of Enforcement, SEC).
243. Id. at 777 (statement of James M. Newman, publisher and editor of SECURrrIES
CLASS ACTION ALERT).
244. See Joel Seligman, The Merits Do Matter A Comment on Professor Grundfest's
"Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commis-
sion's Authority", 108 HARV. L. REV. 438, 444 (1994) (citing Hearings, supra note 242, at
777).
245. Hearings, supra note 242, at 777.
246. Id. at 341 (testimony of A.A. Sommer, Jr., Chairman, Public Oversight Board,
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants).




250. Seligman, supra note 244, at 445-46, 455.
251. Id. at 455 (citing Hearings, supra note 242, at 740).
252. See Hearings, supra note 242, at 876.
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the contrary, the Securities Industry Association reports that the securi-
ties industry raised more than one trillion dollars for corporations
through securities offerings in 1992 alone, more than double the amount
raised in any offering prior to 1989.253 Similarly, the number of initial
public offerings in the years 1989 through 1992 increased steadily from
254 issues raising over 13 billion dollars in 1989 to 603 new issues in 1992
raising nearly 40 billion dollars.2 54
While no legitimate evidence supports the outcry over securities fraud
litigation, there is legitimate evidence supporting the contrary position.
The possibility of meritorious securities fraud litigation creates a percep-
tion of deterrence and compensation among investors which increases
their willingness to participate in the capital markets. In 1929, before the
federal securities laws were enacted, only 1.2% of the American popula-
tion owned corporate stock.255 As of 1990, 21.1% of the American popu-
lation (51 million citizens) owned corporate stock.256 Although this
dramatic increase in stock ownership does not prove a causal relationship
between the disclosure and antifraud provisions of the federal securities
laws and investor confidence in the capital markets, it also does not sup-
port the position that the federal securities fraud regime chills participa-
tion in the capital markets. Enforcement of the mandatory disclosure
provisions of the federal securities laws through private fraud actions may
not fully deter and may not fully compensate defrauded investors. None-
theless, the perception among the more than 50 million Americans inter-
ested in participating in the capital markets, in which such an
enforcement mechanism exists, has done nothing to dampen that interest.
The contrary perception, however, created by judicial or congressional
removal of such enforcement mechanisms just may impede interest.
V. THE JURISDICTIONAL PRINCIPLE IN THE SUPREME
COURT'S SECURITIES FRAUD DECISIONS
The fact that the Supreme Court's securities fraud policies have no em-
pirical basis is not surprising. Whenever the Court leaves the familiar
ground of legal principle and enters the realm of policy, it does so without
reliable guidance. The Court's securities fraud decisions, which tread
heavily upon legislative turf, appear to lack the legitimacy of either legal
rules or political judgments. Nonetheless, those decisions do contain the
germ of a reconciling principle.
In none of its recent decisions construing the implied and express rights
of action for securities fraud has the Court expressly addressed the funda-
mental question of subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts to en-
tertain such actions. Jurisdictional issues are, without doubt, implicit in
253. Id. at 413. See also Seligman, supra note 244, at 440.
254. Hearings, supra note 242, at 159.
255. Seligman, supra note 244, at 456 (citing S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9
(1934); WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACrs 361 (1994)).
256. Seligman, supra note 244, at 456.
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the Court's decisions. Lurking in the Court's decisions, in fact, is a basic
jurisdictional principle: the federal courts may imply private rights of ac-
tion if, but only if, there is subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. 257
This jurisdictional principle has three components. First, federal courts
have no power to create federal common law causes of action.258 Second,
federal courts have no "arising under" jurisdiction over judicially-implied
private rights of action for violations of federal law.259 Third, federal
courts have the power to recognize implied private rights of action for
violations of federal law if they have some alternative basis for jurisdic-
tion over the action. 260 The jurisdictional principle provides a method of
reconciling the Supreme Court's apparently irreconcilable decisions.
. The principle also has a corollary. The federal courts have no power to
reject subject-matter jurisdiction over actions that expressly have been
granted to them by Congress.2 61 This corollary provides a basis for shap-
ing the Court's recent attempt to revise express rights of action for securi-
ties fraud.
A. FEDERAL COURTS MAY ADJUDICATE PRIVATE RIGHTS OF
ACTION ONLY IF THERE IS SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION
1. Jurisdiction Over Private Rights of Action
While state courts may retain the power to create private remedies,
federal courts have no power to create federal private remedies. When a
federal court creates a private right of action for the violation of a federal
statute, it engages in an unconstitutional expansion of its limited subject-
matter jurisdiction.2 62
257. See infra Section VI.A.
258. See infra subsection VI.A.2.
259. See infra subsection VI.A.3.
260. See infra subsection VI.A.4.
261. See infra subsection VI.B; Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
262. As Justice Powell suggested in his dissent in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677, 746 n.17 (1979), the issues of private action implied from a federal statute and
federal jurisdiction are intertwined. The federal courts have no independent power to cre-
ate federal common law because the Constitution nowhere delegates it to the federal judi-
ciary. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("[N]o clause in the Constitution
purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts."). Absent a constitutional dele-
gation to the federal courts of the power to create common law, that power is reserved to
the states. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
The Constitution, however, does delegate to the United States Supreme Court judicial
power over cases "arising under" federal law, U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2; as well as delegate
to Congress the power to create the lower federal courts, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8; id. art. III,
§ 1. Accordingly, Congress created the federal district courts and assigned to them juris-
diction over cases arising under federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). But Congress
cannot assign to the federal courts any greater power than the Constitution assigns to the
federal judiciary. Because the Constitution does not delegate to the federal judiciary the
power to create federal common law, Congress cannot grant jurisdiction to the lower fed-
eral courts to resolve cases arising under federal common law. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
Instead, the jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited to cases arising under the Constitu-
tion, treaties, or congressional enactments. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
If, as Justice Powell recognized in Cannon, the "arising under" jurisdiction of the federal
courts is broad enough to accept a state law cause of action that includes as an element the
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2. The Federal Judiciary Has No Power to Create Private Federal
Remedies
Despite Erie's oft-cited proclamation that "[t]here is no federal general
common law,"'263 federal courts have retained the power to create com-
mon law in two "restricted" circumstances:264 (1) where "necessary to
protect uniquely federal interests" 265 such as those regarding the rights
and obligations of the United States, 266 interstate controversies,267 inter-
national boundary disputes268 and admiralty disputes; 269 or (2) where
"Congress has vested jurisdiction in the federal courts and empowered
them to create governing rules of law."'270 Neither power, however, justi-
fies the judicial creation of private securities fraud remedies.
Although the federal securities statutes embody a federal interest in
eliminating harmful conduct, they do not present the kind of "uniquely
federal interests" that empower the federal courts to fashion federal com-
mon law.271 If that power exists in the realm of securities law, it must
derive from a specific congressional delegation to the federal courts of
violation of a federal statute, then the implication of a private remedy expands the scope of
federal jurisdiction. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 746 n.17. Justice Powell concluded that to the
extent an expansive interpretation of "arising under" jurisdiction permits the federal courts
to "assume control over disputes which Congress did not consign" to them, the interpreta-
tion is constitutionally defective. Id.
Ironically, after Justice Powell's dissent in Cannon, the Supreme Court, as discussed in
this Section, rejected such an expansive interpretation of "arising under" jurisdiction. Ac-
cordingly, this Section contends that even if a cause of action can be implied from a viola-
tion of the federal securities laws, that action does not, and cannot consistently with the
Constitution, "arise under" federal law.
263. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
264. See Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651-52 (1963); see also Texas Indus. v.
Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981); Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers
Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95-98 (1981); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 308-10
(1947).
265. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964).
266. See, e.g., United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 591-94
(1973); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943).
267. See, e.g., Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 98-99 (1972).
268. Banco Nacional, 376 U.S. at 426-27; Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek
Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938) ("Jurisdiction over controversies concerning ... bounda-
ries ... have been recognized as presenting federal questions.").
269. Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 272-73 (1979);
Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106, 111-12 (1974).
270. Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 642. See also Wheeldin, 373 U.S. at 652; Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 450-52 (1957).
271. See Musick, Peter & Garrett v. Employers Ins., 113 S. Ct. 2055, 2088 (1993). Sup-
porting this contention is the following statement of the Texas Industries Court:
Admittedly, there is a federal interest in the sense that vindication of rights
arising out of these congressional enactments supplements federal enforce-
ment and fulfills the objects of the statutory scheme. Notwithstanding that
nexus, contribution among antitrust wrongdoers does not involve the duties
of the Federal Government, the distribution of powers in our federal system,
or matters necessarily subject to federal control even in the absence of statu-
tory authority.
Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 642.
[Vol. 49
JURISDICTION AND SECURITIES FRAUD
both subject-matter jurisdiction and the authority to create governing
rules of law.272
Congress, however, has provided no such grant of power to the federal
courts. In the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,273 Congress gave the fed-
eral district courts "exclusive" subject-matter jurisdiction over all "suits in
equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created
by [that Act] or the rules and regulations thereunder. ' 274 This grant of
jurisdiction, however, is limited to actions based on liabilities or duties
"created by" the federal statute.275 As the Supreme Court has declared,
this language "creates no cause of action of its own force and effect; it
imposes no liabilities. ' 276 Congress has expressly given to the federal
courts jurisdiction over only those actions created by the "substantive
provisions" of the 1934 Act. 277 The mere grant of exclusive federal juris-
diction over actions expressly created by a federal statute does not, how-
ever, empower the federal courts to create additional federal common
law actions which are not expressly created by that statute.278
Additionally, the sweeping antifraud provisions of the federal securities
laws do not justify the creation of federal common law rights. There is no
doubt that the federal securities laws represent a comprehensive congres-
sional effort to regulate interstate securities transactions. 279 The exist-
ence of that scheme alone, however, does not evidence a congressional
intent to delegate to federal courts the power to fashion common law
rights. 28 0 To the contrary, the fact that Congress has created detailed and
specific remedial provisions throughout the federal securities laws creates
a presumption that Congress did not "intend [federal] courts to have the
power to alter or supplement the remedies enacted."' 281 As the Supreme
272. See Wheeldin, 373 U.S. at 651.
273. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1994).
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577 (1979) (holding that the grant
of subject-matter jurisdiction in § 27A of the 1934 Act does not alone empower the federal
courts to create private remedies for violations of the reporting requirements of § 17(a) of
the Act).
277. Id.
278. See Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986);
Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 643-46 (reasoning that congressional delegation to the federal
courts of exclusive jurisdiction over unique remedies for antitrust law violations does not
include a delegation to create an additional common law right to contribution).
279. The federal regulatory scheme is based upon the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77bbbb (1994), the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, id. 88 78a-7811, and their
amendments. See, e.g., The Williams Act, codified at id. §§ 78m(d), (e); n(d), (f). The 1933
Act regulates the offer and sale of securities by imposing civil liability for filing a materially
false registration statement, id. § 77k, or prospectus, id. § 771(2). The scope of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 is broad in that it governs registration, distribution, sale, and
resale of securities in interstate commerce. See, e.g., id. § 78j(b) (unlawful for person to
utilize interstate commerce to "use or employ ... any manipulative or deceptive device").
The 1934 Act criminalizes the fraudulent sale and purchase of securities, id. § 78j(b), as
well as manipulation insider trading, and misstatements in filed documents. Id. §§ 78i,
78(b), 78r(a).
280. See Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 644-45.
281. Id. at 645.
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Court recently concluded, "[t]he presumption that a remedy was deliber-
ately omitted from a statute is strongest when Congress has enacted a
comprehensive legislative scheme including an integrated system of pro-
cedures for enforcement." 282 Even in the context of the antitrust laws
where "the federal courts enjoy more flexibility and act more as common-
law courts than in other areas governed by federal statute, 283 the
Supreme Court has held that congressional delegation of federal jurisdic-
tion over a comprehensive remedial scheme does not include a delegation
of power to create federal common law remedies. 284
Moreover, the necessity for federal courts to interpret and apply con-
gressional statutes does not empower those courts to supplement the
remedies provided in such statutes. The federal courts certainly have the
authority to give "concrete meaning" to federal statutes through "a pro-
cess of case-by-case judicial decision in the common-law tradition. '285
Jurisdiction to resolve cases or controversies created by federal statutes
naturally includes the power to interpret "ambiguous or incomplete pro-
visions. ' 286 The power to develop a federal common law through court
decisions interpreting and applying federal statutes, however, does not
extend to the creation of remedies not within the congressional statutes
being interpreted or applied.287 The federal courts' inherent authority to
interpret federal securities laws in the course of deciding the myriad ac-
tions expressly created by those laws, therefore, does not include the au-
thority to create additional federal common law rights and remedies.
3. The Federal Courts Have No "Arising Under" Jurisdiction Over
Implied Rights of Action for Violations of Federal Securities
Law
Even if the federal courts had the power to imply a private, common
law cause of action for the violation of the federal securities laws, those
courts nonetheless would lack subject-matter jurisdiction over that action.
In its decisions interpreting the elements of private rights of action for
securities fraud, the Supreme Court has never reached the issue whether
any such remedies arise under federal law for purposes of providing an
independent basis for subject-matter jurisdiction in federal district
282. Id. (citing Northwest Airlines v. 'ftansport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981)).
283. Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 98 n.42 (citing National Soc'y of Professional
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978)).
284. See Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 646. Even in the exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction,
the Supreme Court refuses to "fashion new remedies that might upset carefully considered
legislative programs." Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 97.
285. Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 95.
286. Id. at 97.
287. Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 646 (quoting Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 97. "In al-
most any statutory scheme, there may be a need for judicial interpretation of ambiguous or
incomplete provisions. But the authority to construe a statute is fundamentally different
from the authority to fashion a new rule or to provide a new remedy which Congress has
decided not to adopt." Id.).
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courts.288 Significantly, in both of the cases in which the implied rights
under sections 14(a) and 10(b) were first created, the federal courts had
diversity jurisdiction over the actions. In Borak,289 the Supreme Court
recognized an implied private right of action under section 14(a) for
proxy fraud only after first making absolutely clear that the federal courts
had diversity jurisdiction over the claims filed.29 ° Similarly, in Kardon,291
where the Court first created the implied section 10(b) claim, the Court
expressly did not reach the question whether that claim arose under fed-
eral law because diversity jurisdiction existed in the case.292
Nor, in any of its section 10(b) decisions, has the Supreme Court ever
directly confronted a viable section 10(b) claim in which the violation of
such was the only basis for jurisdiction in federal court. In some section
10(b) decisions the Supreme Court has held that no private right of action
exists for the plaintiffs' claims at all.293 In all of the remaining cases, the
plaintiffs asserted an independent basis for federal jurisdiction.294 In
these cases, the federal courts had subject-matter jurisdiction over the
securities fraud claims based upon the doctrine of supplemental jurisdic-
tion.295 In no case, therefore, has the Supreme Court reached the issue
288. Because the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, see U.S. CONsT. art.
III, § 2, there must be an independent jurisdictional basis for each claim filed in federal
court. See, e.g., American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17 (1951). After exercis-
ing its exclusive power to create the federal district courts, Congress assigned those courts
original jurisdiction over claims "arising under" federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
289. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
290. Id at 427-28.
291. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
292. Id. at 514.
293. See, e.g., Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 364
(1991) (no private right of action filed more than three years after the challenged transac-
tion or one year from discovery); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-77 (1977) (no
private right of action for corporate mismanagement); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 206 (1976) (no private right of action exists under § 10(b) for negligence); Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 755 (1975) (no private right of action
exists for offerees of stock who neither purchased nor sold securities).
294. See Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2086 (initial claims brought under § 11 and § 12 of the
1933 Act afforded supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. V 1993) for the
related § 10(b) contribution claim); Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472
U.S. 299, 304-05, 309-10 (1985) (§ 10(b) claims are supplemental to other express federal
claims, including those under the 1933 Act); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S.
375, 387 (1983) (assuming the existence of cumulative remedies under § 11 of the 1933 Act,
there will be supplemental jurisdiction for the related § 10(b) claims); Affiliated Ute Citi-
zens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 143 (1972) (jurisdiction asserted under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1399, 2409 (1988) as the United States was a party-defendant); Superintendent of Ins. v.
Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 7 (1971) (because plaintiffs pled claims under the
express liability provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, the federal court had supplemen-
tal jurisdiction over the related § 10(b) claims). But see Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
224, 250 (1988) (only six Justices participated in a decision defining materiality as it ap-
pears in § 10(b) finding that it was not inappropriate for the lower court to certify a class
based on a rebuttable presumption of reliance).
295. The term "supplemental jurisdiction" derives from the congressional codification
of the judicial doctrines of "pendent" and "ancillary" jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp.
V 1993). See Thomas M. Mengler et al., Congress Accepts Supreme Court's Invitation to
Codify Supplemental Jurisdiction, 74 JUDICATURE 213 (1991). Supplemental jurisdiction
affords federal district courts original jurisdiction over non-federal, non-diverse claims
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whether an implied private right of action for securities fraud is a claim
"arising under" federal law which would afford independent "arising
under" jurisdiction for that action.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934's specific grant to the federal
courts of exclusive jurisdiction over actions to enforce liabilities "created
by" that Act does not alone provide for subject-matter jurisdiction over
judicially created actions such as the private section 14(a) or section 10(b)
remedies. 296 Furthermore, although Congress has granted the federal
district courts original jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under the
... laws ... of the United States,"297 that grant of jurisdiction does not
extend to judicially created private actions for the violation of a federal
statute.
The Constitution provides that federal judicial power shall extend to
"all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under ... the Laws of the United
States. '298 This constitutional grant of jurisdiction has been interpreted
with "great breadth" to confer original jurisdiction upon the Supreme
Court "whenever a federal question is an 'ingredient' of the action" or
whenever a case involves " 'potential federal questions.' ",299 This broad
constitutional grant of jurisdiction, however, has no independent applica-
tion to the lower federal courts. Instead, the Constitution empowers
Congress, and only Congress, to "ordain and establish . . . inferior
Courts" to the Supreme Court and to define the jurisdiction of those in-
ferior federal courts. 300 The federal courts have no constitutional power
to expand their own subject-matter jurisdiction.301 While Congress can-
not assign to the lower federal courts any more power than the Constitu-
tion confers upon the Supreme Court, Congress can assign lower federal
courts less power than allowed to the Supreme Court by the Constitu-
tion.302 Indeed, although Congress's statutory grant of jurisdiction to the
lower federal courts virtually copies the Constitution's grant of federal
which are so related to joined federal claims that they are part of the same constitutional
case. Id. at 214-15.
296. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1994). See also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560,
577 (1979).
297. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
298. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
299. See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 818 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Osborn v. Bank
of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824)); see also Verlinden B.V. v. Central
Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 491-94 (1983)); Union Pac. Ry. v. Meyers (The Pac. R.R.
Removal Cases), 115 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1885); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.
448, 471 (1957) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
304, 351 (1816).
300. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. See also Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 807 (The constitutional
grant of judicial power in "arising under" cases is not "self-executing.").
301. American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17-18 (1951); Lockerty v. Phil-
lips, 319 U.S. 182, 187-88 (1943); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1922);
see also United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 179 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
302. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; id. amend X; Lampf, 501 U.S. at 365 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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judicial power,30 3 the Supreme Court has interpreted the congressional
delegation of lower court jurisdiction much more restrictively than the
constitutional grant.3°4
Under the Supreme Court's current view of the congressional grant of
"arising under" jurisdiction to federal district courts, there is no doubt
that those courts have the power to hear cases in which a federal statute
actually "creates" the cause of action.30 5 In Moore,306 the Supreme Court
concluded, however, that an implied right of action for the violation of a
federal statute is created by state law rather than federal law. Moore
filed two claims against the railroad, alleging he was injured as a result of
a defective lever he used in attempting to uncouple freight cars. The
Court concluded that the first claim brought under the Federal Employ-
ers' Liability Act, 307 which provides for an express private right of action,
clearly arose under federal law.308
As to the second claim, however, the Supreme Court concluded that
because the allegations in Moore's complaint relied upon the Federal
Safety Appliance Act 30 9 for the duty of care and not for the right to sue,
that claim did not arise under federal law.310 Although the federal stat-
ute supplied the duty, "the right to recover damages... sprang from the
principle of the common law," and therefore supplied no basis for federal
court "arising under" jurisdiction.31' The Moore Court reconciled its
holding with Rigsby by recalling that the action in Rigsby was "brought in
the state court and was removed to the federal court upon the ground
that the defendant was a federal corporation. '312
In situations where federal provisions do not create a private cause of
action, subject-matter jurisdiction for actions must be based on "the pres-
ence of a claimed violation of the statute as an element of a state cause of
action. ' 313 There is considerable doubt, however, as to whether the fed-
eral courts are empowered to hear claims that are not created by federal
law, but rather merely hinge on a question of federal law.314
303. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdic-
tion of all civil actions arising under the ... laws ... of the United States."
304. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 807.
305. Id. at 808 (quoting American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S.
257, 260 (1916)).
306. Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 291 U.S. 205, 211-12 (1934).
307. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988).
308. Moore, 291 U.S. at 211.
309. Act of Mar. 2, 1893, ch. 196, 27 Stat. 531, repealed by Act of July 5, 1994, Pub. L,
No. 103-272, § 7(b), 108 Stat. 1379 (1994).
310. Id. at 211-15.
311. Id at 215-16 (citing Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1916)).
312. Id. at 215 n.6.
313. See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814.
314. See id. at 813-14. See also id. at 821 n.1 (Brennan, J. dissenting). Compare Moore,
291 U.S. at 214-15 (no arising under jurisdiction over state law claim that necessarily de-
pends on the interpretation of a federal statute) with Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust
Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199-200 (1921) (arising under jurisdiction exists over state law claim that
necessarily depends on the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution).
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In Franchise Tax,315 the Supreme Court declared that a case may arise
under "federal law where the vindication of a right under state law neces-
sarily turned on some construction of federal law."'316 As the Supreme
Court itself later cautioned in Merrell Dow, however, its "actual holding"
in Franchise Tax rejects that basis for federal jurisdiction.317 The
Supreme Court acknowledged that the plaintiffs' state law claims in
Franchise Tax hinged on a substantial question of federal law, yet the
Court denied the existence of "arising under" jurisdiction.318
In Merrell Dow, the Supreme Court made explicit that the federal dis-
trict courts have no jurisdiction over causes of action created by state law,
even where they necessarily depend upon the judicial construction of a
federal statute. 319 The plaintiffs there sought damages for injuries alleg-
edly caused by Merrell Dow's failure to satisfy the branding requirements
of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).320 The Supreme
Court assumed that the FDCA did not itself create a private right of ac-
tion for monetary relief.32' This assumption led the Court to assume fur-
ther that "some combination" of the then-controlling Cort v. Ash 322
implication factors was not present.323
Accordingly, the Court reasoned that "careful scrutiny of legislative in-
tent" would reveal the absence of any congressional desire to provide for
a private right of action.324 Finally, the Court concluded that "the con-
gressional determination that there should be no federal remedy for the
violation of this federal statute [was] tantamount to a congressional con-
clusion that the presence of a claimed violation of the statute as an ele-
ment of a state cause of action [was] insufficiently 'substantial' to confer
federal-question jurisdiction. ' 325 The Court found that the federal statu-
tory issue was not sufficiently substantial despite the fact that Congress
had created a comprehensive scheme for enforcing federal food, drug and
cosmetic standards 326 and had vested jurisdiction exclusively in the fed-
315. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
316. Id. at 9; see also Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 808-09.
317. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 809.
318. Id. at 801.
319. Id. at 817.
320. Id. at 805. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (1994).
321. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 810. Both parties agreed that the FDCA contains no
private right of action. Id. But that concurrence is hardly based on the merits of the argu-
ments rejecting the private remedy. Rather, the defendants despite their desire to litigate
in federal court, did not wish to acknowledge the existence of any private FDCA remedy
which could be used against them. The plaintiffs', despite their desire for a remedy, denied
the existence of a federal cause of action, so that they could remain in state court.
322. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
323. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 810-11.
324. Id. at 811-12 (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S.
353, 377 (1982)).
325. Id. at 814.
326. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (1994). The dissent, however, noted that:
The enforcement scheme established by the FDCA is typical of other, simi-
larly broad regulatory schemes. Primary responsibility for overseeing imple-
mentation of the Act has been conferred upon a specialized administrative
agency, here the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Congress has pro-
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eral district courts for all claims brought under the statute. 327 Whatever
doubt remains regarding federal jurisdiction over state law claims that
depend on the construction of a "substantial question" of federal law, 328
there is no doubt that the federal courts have no jurisdiction over claims
created by state law that depend on the construction of a federal
statute. 3
29
vided the FDA with a wide-ranging arsenal of weapons to combat violations
of the FDCA, including authority to obtain an ex parte court order for the
seizure of goods subject to the Act, see 21 U.S.C. § 334, authority to initiate
proceedings in a federal district court to enjoin continuing violations of the
FDCA, see § 332, and authority to request a United States Attorney to bring
criminal proceedings against violators, see § 333.
Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 830 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
327. 21 U.S.C. §§ 332(a), 333, 334(a)(1) (1994). "Congress structured the FDCA so
that all express remedies are provided by the federal courts ...." Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at
831 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The FDCA, in this respect, is indistinguishable from the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Both create exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts
for express remedies and both create a specialized administrative agency responsible for
overseeing implementation and enforcement of the statutory standards. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa (1994).
328. The Merrell Dow majority did not eliminate federal jurisdiction for state law
claims which turn on a substantial question of federal law. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814.
The Court concluded that the presence of a federal statutory standard as an element of a
state law cause of action did not rise to the level of a substantial federal question. Id.
329. The Merrell Dow majority reconciled its holding with Smith v. Kansas City Title &
Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921) by suggesting that Smith involved a question of the "consti-
tutionality of an important federal statute" rather than merely the construction of an im-
portant federal statute. 478 U.S. at 814-15 n.12. The "nature" of the constitutional issue at
stake in Smith was different from the "nature" of the federal statutory issue at stake in
Merrell Dow. MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCA-
TION OF JUDICIAL POWER 67 (1st ed. 1980). See also William Cohen, The Broken Com-
pass: The Requirement That a Case Arise "Directly" Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L.
REv. 890, 916 (1967); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543,
569 (1985). The dissent takes issue with the majority's effort to reconcile Smith, asserting
that Smith is a vital and influential case which cannot be reconciled on a clearly-defined,
principled basis with cases like Moore and Merrell Dow. 478 U.S. at 821-24 n.1 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
'Yet, there can be no dispute that the Supreme Court has made a clear distinction be-
tween the constitutional questions at stake in cases such as Smith and the federal statutory
questions at stake in cases such as Moore. In Smith, the Supreme Court affirmed federal
jurisdiction over a shareholder's suit to enjoin a corporation from issuing bonds on the
grounds that the federal statute, which authorized the issuance, was unconstitutional.
Smith, 255 U.S. at 199-202. The Court announced the "general rule" that federal jurisdic-
tion exists where the plaintiff's "right to relief depends on the construction or application
of the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that such federal claim is not merely
colorable, and rests upon a reasonable foundation." Id. at 199. Yet, in Smith, the Court
argued that it was "the constitutional validity of an act of Congress which is directly drawn
in question" that supported the exercise of federal jurisdiction. Id. at 201.
In Moore, by contrast, the federal question derived from a federal statute (the Federal
Safety and Appliance Acts) that created a duty, the breach of which gave rise to a state law
tort action. Moore, 291 U.S. at 216-17 (quoting Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie
Ry. v. Popplar, 237 U.S. 369, 372 (1915)) ("The federal statute, in the present case, touched
the duty of the master at a single point and, save as provided in the statute, the right of the
plaintiff to recover was left to be determined by the law of the state."). Similarly, in Mer-
rell Dow, the FDCA touched on the duty of drug manufacturers such as Merrell Dow at a
single point, and the right of the plaintiff to recover was left to be determined by state law.
See supra note 328.
The jurisdictional distinction between claims that depend upon a construction of a fed-
eral statute and those which depend upon a construction of the Constitution has also been
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Under the reasoning of Merrell Dow, Franchise Tax, and Moore, there-
fore, a claimed violation of the federal securities laws as an element of a
state law action for damages is "insufficiently 'substantial' to confer fed-
eral-question jurisdiction. '330 The original congressional determination
that there should be no private remedy for the violation of a provision of
the federal securities laws is "tantamount" to a congressional conclusion
that the necessity of construing that standard in resolving a state law
claim for its violation does not present a "substantial" federal question. 331
The federal courts, therefore, have no independent "arising under" ju-
risdiction over implied private rights of action under the federal securities
laws. 332 The continued recognition of independent federal subject-matter
jurisdiction over such implied private securities fraud actions is an uncon-
stitutional exercise of federal judicial power.
4. The Federal Courts May Imply Private Remedies for Securities
Fraud in Diversity and Supplemental Jurisdiction Cases
In Moore, the Supreme Court made clear that any private right of ac-
tion for the violation of a federal statute that a court creates without con-
gressional intent must have its origin in state tort law.333 To the extent
that the judicial creation of an implied right of action for violations of
section 10(b) and section 14(a) is based on a theory of judicial power
which permits the creation of private remedies absent an expressed con-
gressional intent to the contrary, 334 therefore, those rights of action must
be a creation of state law.335
That the federal courts have no "arising under" jurisdiction over im-
plied private actions for securities fraud, however, does not necessarily
deprive those courts of jurisdiction to adjudicate such actions. In its
grants of diversity jurisdiction 336 and supplemental jurisdiction,337 Con-
gress has given the federal courts the power to adjudicate claims created
struck in the Supreme Court's implied right of action decisions. See Schweiker v. Chilicky,
487 U.S. 412 (1988).
330. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814.
331. Id.
332. The federal courts would have subject-matter jurisdiction over private rights of
action in diversity cases (28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988)) or in cases where that action is supple-
mental to other claims for which there is an independent jurisdictional basis. 28 U.S.C.§ 1367 (1988 & Supp. V 1994). See, e.g., Moore, 291 U.S. at 214-15; Kardon, 69 F. Supp. at
514.
333. Moore, 291 U.S. at 215 ("The Safety Appliance Acts having prescribed the duty in
this fashion, the right to recover damages sustained by the injured employee through the
breach of duty sprang from the principle of the common law .... ).
334. See, e.g., Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins., 113 S. Ct. 2085, 2088 (1993)(citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730, 737 (1975)); Kardon, 69
F. Supp. at 513 (citing Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916)).
335. Indeed, there is no genuine dispute that Congress, in enacting the 1934 Act, did
not create private remedies for the violation of § 10(b). See, e.g., Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind,
Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 359 (1991) ("We have made no pretense
that it was Congress' design to provide the remedy afforded.").
336. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
337. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. V 1993).
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by state law. When a federal court is called upon to adjudicate such state
law claims, it acts as a court of the state whose law provides the rules of
decision in the case.338 In its role as a surrogate state court, the federal
court in such instances becomes a common law court of the state. It ob-
tains the power to recognize common law causes of action. As state com-
mon law courts, therefore, the federal courts have the power to recognize
private rights of action which have been implied under state common law
and, additionally, to create private rights of action under implication prin-
ciples prevalent in the state.
If the federal courts were to recognize a private right of action created
by state law, they would simply be applying familiar principles of the
common law of torts. There is no genuine doubt that federal courts have
the constitutional power to recognize implied rights of action created by
tort law in the state which supplies the rules of decision for the action.339
Moreover, none of the Supreme Court's decisions rejecting or limiting
the judicial implication of federal private rights of action for securities
fraud address this very different issue of whether the federal courts have
the power in diversity or supplemental jurisdiction cases to recognize a
state law cause of action for the violation of the federal securities laws.
Clearly, the federal courts have such power.
The components of the jurisdictional principle dictate that the federal
courts have no power to imply a federal private right of action for securi-
ties fraud and no "arising under" subject-matter jurisdiction over any
such action. If, however, the federal courts have an independent basis for
subject-matter jurisdiction by virtue of diversity or supplemental jurisdic-
tion, they may recognize, and even create, a state law implied private
right of action for the violation of the federal securities laws.
The jurisdictional principle indicates that the federal courts have no
"arising under" jurisdiction over any implied right of action for securities
fraud. Accordingly, in the absence of any independent subject-matter ju-
risdiction, the federal courts have no power to adjudicate any implied
securities fraud rights of action, including the implied section 14(a) ac-
tion, the implied section 10(b) action, the implied section 10(b) contribu-
tion action, and the implied section 10(b) secondary liability action. If,
however, the federal courts have independent subject-matter jurisdiction
over an action based on diversity or supplemental jurisdiction, they may
entertain state-law-created private rights of action for securities fraud
violations.
B. THE FEDERAL COURTS MUST ADJUDICATE MATTERS WITHIN
THEIR JURISDICTION
The jurisdictional principle just examined has a necessary corollary. As
the Supreme Court has declared: "It is most true that this Court will not
338. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
339. See supra notes 337-38 and accompanying text.
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take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is equally true, that it must take
jurisdiction if it should. '340 Similarly, the Court has made clear that the
federal judiciary has "no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction
which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the
other would be treason to the constitution."'341
The Supreme Court has "steadily held" that the federal courts may not
decline to exercise jurisdiction over cases or controversies properly
before them.342 A federal court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over
a particular action only in situations involving the doctrines of abstention
or forum non conveniens. 343 Each of those doctrines, however, permits
the federal courts to decline jurisdiction only in specific instances. They
do not afford the federal courts a basis for rejecting jurisdiction in cases
where the "special circumstances" required by the doctrines are ab-
sent.344 In the absence of these circumstances, the federal courts have a
"duty" to adjudicate matters entrusted to their subject-matter
jurisdiction.345
The federal courts, therefore, must exercise the jurisdiction which Con-
gress expressly has granted to them to adjudicate cases arising under fed-
eral law. The Supreme Court has no power to permit the federal courts
to reject cases within the jurisdiction because Congress has the "sole
power" to create lower federal courts and to assign to them jurisdiction
within constitutional limits.346
C. THE APPLICATION OF THE JURISDICTIONAL PRINCIPLE TO THE
SUPREME COURT'S SECURITIES FRAUD CASES
This jurisdictional principle can be used to reconcile the Supreme
Court's implied right of action decisions, even-to some extent-its re-
cent decisions in Central Bank and Musick.
340. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
341. Id.
342. McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 281 (1910). See Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S.
472, 491-92 (1949); Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529, 534 (1893); Cohens, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) at 403-04.
343. Abstention in its various forms is required in a case in which "the exercise of juris-
diction would create an unwarranted friction between federal and state sovereigns." Wei-
ner v. Shearson, Hammel & Co., 521 F.2d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 1975). See, e.g., Railroad
Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941). The doctrine of forum non con-
veniens gives the federal court discretion to dismiss an action if the chosen forum is grossly
inconvenient and if another forum exists. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501
(1947).
344. See Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 491-92 (1949); Weiner, 521 F.2d at 819-20.
345. See Propper, 337 U.S. at 491-92; Chicot County, 148 U.S at 534 ("[T]he courts of
the United States are bound to proceed to judgment and to afford redress to suitors before
them in every case to which their jurisdiction extends. They cannot abdicate their author-
ity or duty ....").
346. Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845). See also Palmore v. United
States, 411 U.S. 389, 400-02 (1973); Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943); Kline v.
Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922); Plaquemines Tropical Fruit Co. v. Henderson, 170
U.S. 511 (1898),
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First, the jurisdictional principle justifies the Supreme Court's decisions
which consistently limit the scope of implied securities fraud remedies.
The Supreme Court has suggested two theoretical bases for the judicial
creation of private remedies for securities fraud: (1) federal judicial
power to create remedies, absent congressional intent, and (2) congres-
sional acquiescence in the federal judicial power to create remedies for
statutory violations. 347 As the Court itself has recognized, however,
neither of these theories can survive constitutional analysis.
The Court has rejected as "entirely misplaced ' 348 the judicial implica-
tion of private remedies based on the principles of federal court remedial
power followed in earlier cases such as Borak.349 At the same time, the
Court has acknowledged that the judicial implication of the section 10(b)
private remedy is based on the flawed reasoning of those outmoded
cases.350 Even in the rare instances in which the Court has tolerated the
judicial implication of private rights of action, 35' the Court has made it
347. The Supreme Court first characterized its own acceptance of the private remedy
by declaring that it had "explicitly acquiesced" in the lower federal court recognition of the
private remedy. In Musick, the Court recently suggested that the § 10(b) private right of
action was created by the lower federal courts on the theory that they are empowered to
create remedies for violations of federal statutes, even absent congressional intent. 113 S.
Ct. at 2088.
As an alternative to this theory of federal court remedial power, the Supreme Court has
indicated that the § 10(b) private remedy also can be justified by congressional acquies-
cence to the judicial creation of that remedy. The Musick Court finds evidence of congres-
sional acquiescence in the federal courts' creation and interpretation of implied rights of
action under § 10(b). Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2089. In Basic, the Supreme Court included
"legislative acquiescence" as a foundation for the judicial implication of the private § 10(b)
remedy. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988). Similarly, in Huddleston, the
Court based its cumulative construction of the remedies provided by the federal securities
laws on congressional acquiescence. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,
384-85 (1983).
In Huddleston, the Court supported the cumulative use of the implied § 10(b) remedy
with express securities laws remedies by arguing that "when Congress comprehensively
revised the securities laws in 1975, a consistent line of judicial decisions had permitted
plaintiffs to sue under § 10(b) regardless of the availability of express remedies .... Con-
gress' decision to leave § 10(b) intact suggests that Congress ratified the cumulative nature
of the § 10(b) action." Id. at 384-86.
348. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979) ("The central inquiry
remains whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or by implication, a private
cause of action.").
349. J. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). See also Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby,
241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916); Kardon, 69 F. Supp. at 512-13.
350. See Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2088 (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 730, 737 (1975)).
351. With rare exception, the Supreme Court, in cases since and including Cort v. Ash,
422 U.S' 66 (1975), has denied the existence of an implied private remedy. See Thompson
v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988) (Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980); Massa-
chusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985) (Employee Retirement Income
Security Act 1974); Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523 (1984) (investment com-
pany does not have an implied right of action under § 36(b) of the Investment Company
Act of 1940); Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981) (Davis-Bacon
Act); Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union of America, 451 U.S. 77 (1981)
(Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Middlesex County
Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) (no implied right of
action for contribution exists under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act or the Marine
Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc.
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clear that the implication must be based on evidence of congressional
intent. 352 Yet, the Court also has concluded that the implication of a pri-
vate right of action under section 10(b) cannot be supported by any evi-
dence of congressional intent.353 The Court acknowledged, 354 and recent
scholarship has confirmed, 355 that when Congress enacted section 10(b)
in 1934 it did not intend to create or to have the courts create a private
right of action for damages.
Nor can courts rely on the theory of legislative acquiescence to justify
the creation of private remedies. In its purest form, the theory of legisla-
tive acquiescence is that congressional silence in the wake of the judicial
construction of a statute indicates congressional approval of that judicial
construction. 356 The legislative acquiescence theory gains additional
strength when Congress has either reenacted 357 a statute without altering
the judicially-construed portion or has altered other provisions of the
statute, leaving intact the judicially construed provision.358 As the
Supreme Court recently declared, that theory is flawed because it permits
courts to assign unjustifiable and unconstitutional significance to the inac-
tion of post-enactment Congresses.359 The doctrine of legislative acquies-
v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (no private remedy against accountants auditing financial re-
ports as required by § 206 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940); Piper v. Chris-Craft
Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (defeated tender offeror does not have an implied cause of action
against successful competitor under § 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1924). But
see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982) (implied remedy
for damages under the Commodity Exchange Act); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677 (1979) (implied remedy exists under § 901(a) of Title IX).
352. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 688. See also Touche Ross & Co., 442 U.S. at 568.
353. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 359 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196
(1976)) ("[W]e have made no pretense that it was Congress' design to provide the remedy
afforded"). See also Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 196 ("[T]here is no indication that Congress,
or the Commission when adopting Rule 10b-5, contemplated such a remedy .... ").
354. See, e.g., Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2088; Lampf, 501 U.S. at 359; Blue Chip Stamps, 421
U.S. at 730, 737.
355. Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act, 42 STAN. L. REv. 385 (1990).
356. The Supreme Court has explained this principle in these terms: "When a court says
to a legislature: 'you (or your predecessor) meant X,' it almost invites the legislature to
answer: 'We did not.'" Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 630 n.7 (1987)
(quoting GuIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 31-32 (1982)).
357. See Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 384; Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978).
358. See, e.g., Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580-81; Don E. Williams Co. v. Commissioner, 429
U.S. 569, 576-77 (1977) (legislative acquiescence to agency constructions of a statute);
United States v. Cerecedo Hermanos y Compania, 209 U.S. 337, 339 (1908) (legislative
acquiescence to agency constructions of a statute). But see Leary v. United States, 395 U.S.
6, 24-25 (1969); United States v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351, 359 (1957); Committee v. Glen-
shaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
Compare Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946) ("It is at best treach[e]rous
[sic] to find in Congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law.") with
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 488 (1940) ("The long time failure of Congress
to alter the Act after it had been judicially construed ... is persuasive of legislative recogni-
tion that the judicial construction is the correct one.").
359. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1453. See also Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let Congress
Do It": The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REv. 177,
184-96 (1989).
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cence is contrary to the realities of congressional conduct,360 and it is
contrary to the constitutional roles assigned to the legislature and to the
judiciary. 361 Nor does the actual legislative experience with the federal
360. First, there is no evidence that a majority of the members of Congress typically is
aware of Court decisions interpreting statutes. What evidence there is suggests that "most
Supreme Court decisions never come to the attention of Congress." Marshall, supra note
359, at 186 (quoting Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the
Constitution? 61 N.C. L. REV. 587, 609 (1983)). Even if some members of Congress, by
virtue of their leadership or subcommittee roles, follow judicial interpretations of legisla-
tion, their knowledge rarely spreads to a majority of the Senate and the House of Repre-
sentatives. Marshall, supra at 187-88.
Second, even if Congress is fully aware of the judicial construction of its legislation and
even if a majority of Congress disagrees with that construction, there is no guarantee that
Congress will take corrective action. Congressional inaction is often the product not of
approval, but of "inertia" or even "paralysis." Id. at 190-91.
Third, even if congressional inaction does indicate approval of the judicial construction
of a statute, it is often difficult to determine which precise aspect of that construction Con-
gress approves. Id. at 193. Congressional silence may indicate approval of the Court's
actual result in a case, or it could indicate approval of the Court's exercise of power in
interpreting the statute. Id. at 192. In addition, Congress could approve of the Court's
disposition of the case on a substantive point wholly unrelated to the legislation, or on a
procedural point unrelated to the substance of the legislation itself. Indeed, the ambiguity
present in virtually every Court decision naturally renders congressional inaction in the
wake of a Court decision also ambiguous. Professor Marshall has thoroughly attacked this
premise in the context of statutory stare decisis. He shows that ignorance, inertia, interpre-
tational ambiguity, and irrelevance make it difficult to infer congressional approval from
congressional inaction. Id. at 184-96.
361. The Constitution, with rare clarity, requires that before a law can be enacted, it
must be "passed" by both houses of Congress and "presented" to the President. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 ("Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives
and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President of the United
States .... ). See also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946 (1983) (The presentment clause
and bicameral enactment are "integral part[s] of the constitutional design for the separa-
tion of powers."). This requirement alone ensures a multifaceted balance of power: (1) a
law cannot be enacted without approval of both the House and the Senate, giving to each
veto power; (2) a law cannot be enacted without first being presented to the President,
giving to the President modified veto power (Congress retains the power to override a
presidential veto by a two-thirds vote. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3) and (3) because a law
can only be enacted if approved by both houses of Congress and presented to the Presi-
dent, it cannot be enacted by the judiciary.
The equation of congressional inaction with congressional approval of the judicial inter-
pretation of a statute threatens each of these balances. The equation effectively gives to
each house of Congress not the power to veto legislation, but the power to pass legislation.
For, so long as one house fails to pass legislation disapproving the judicial interpretation of
a statute, Congress as a whole is deemed to approve that interpretation. While a minority
of the most powerful members within each house of Congress does not have the power to
pass legislation (RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. Doc. No. 279, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 508 (1985)), that minority may well have the power to block legislation.
See Marshall, supra note 359, at 188 ("[T]he power of congressional leaders is largely a
negative power; they often can control the agenda in a manner that effectively kills certain
proposed legislation."). Under the theory of legislative acquiescence, if a strong minority
of one house of Congress blocks legislation which would negate the judicial interpretation
of a statute, that minority is treated as having the affirmative power to fashion legislation
approving the interpretation. See id. ("A great many provisions of the Constitution (in-
cluding bicameralism, the executive veto, and judicial review) present impediments to the
passage of legislation, reflecting the essentially conservative bias of our system of govern-
ment.") (citing JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PRO-
cEss 26 (1980)).
Similarly, the doctrine of legislative acquiescence usurps the presidential veto power.
The constitutional requirement that legislation be presented to the President for a poten-
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tial veto creates an additional countermajoritarian check on that legislation. Id. at 188.
The President's veto not only gives to the Executive the power to block legislation, it also
helps to subject such legislation to the public attention which flows from any presidential
decision to veto that legislation. Id. at 194. When the presidential veto is exercised, the
constitutional requirement of a two-thirds vote to override the veto empowers a minority
of Congress to prevent the enactment of the legislation. This requirement additionally
extends the length and intensity of public analysis of the legislation.
The theory of legislative acquiescence upsets this process at every turn. By failing to
pass legislation disapproving the judicial construction of a statute, Congress is viewed as
having enacted legislation approving that construction. By its inaction, Congress thereby
avoids the need to present its laws to the President, avoids the presidential veto power
avoids the constitutional check on its lawmaking power and avoids the public scrutiny
which comes from the process itself. Id. ("Inaction enables Congress to effectuate its will
without ever risking presidential veto (not to mention public scrutiny or pressure").). Thejudicial treatment of congressional inaction as the equivalent of congressional legislation,
therefore, disrupts the constitutional roles assigned to the President and the Congress in
the lawmaking process.
The doctrine of legislative acquiescence also upsets the roles that the Constitution as-
signs to the legislative and judicial branches of government. The Constitution requires that
"[ajll legislative Powers" shall be vested in Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. This appar-
ently clear assignment of legislative power has been interpreted in two different ways. Thedelegation of power to Congress could mean that Congress has the exclusive power to
make law and therefore that the judiciary is constitutionally prohibited from doing so.(For a particularly stark example of this view, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law
Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1985) (finding that the Constitution pro-
hibits the courts from making law and that the courts must therefore adhere strictly to
congressional intent in construing a statute)).
On the other hand, the Constitution's delegation of "legislative powers" to the Congress
has been interpreted as an exclusive delegation to Congress only of the power to enact
statutes, leaving to the federal courts the power to create common law. See William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1499 (1987). Es-
kridge argues that this power to make common law is consistent with the Framers' view of
separation of powers, a view which tolerated shared lawmaking power, but not concen-
trated lawmaking power. Id. at 1501.
But even the most strident advocates of federal judicial power accept the qualification
that the Court's task in applying a statute should be to attempt to interpret the will of the
legislature and not to create its own law. See id. at 1501 n.88 (quoting THE FEDERALIST
No. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The courts must de-
clare the sense of the law; and if they should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of
JUDGMENT, the consequences would equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that
of the legislative body.").
When the courts presume congressional approval from congressional silence, they not
only fail to administer the will of the legislature which enacted the legislation, they ex-
pressly and knowingly interpret the statute in a manner contrary to the will of that legisla-
ture. Legislative acquiescence is a doctrine that presumes congressional intent from the
silence of the legislature in the wake of a court decision interpreting a statute. In its first
interpretation of the statute, the Court endeavors to divine the legislative intent of the
Congress which enacted the legislation. See, e.g., Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S.
750, 758 (1979); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 354 n.39(1977). This initial act of judicial power is consistent with the role assigned to the judiciary
in the Constitution. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
533 (1983). See also Oscar Mayer, 441 U.S. at 758. After that first interpretation, however,
the Court revisits its prior construction of a statute and discovers that its initial interpreta-
tion of the intent of the enacting legislature was incorrect. See Marshall, supra note 359, at
186; see also John C. Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search for Legislative Intent: A
Venture Into "Speculative Unrealities", 64 B.U. L. REv. 731, 741 (1984). The Court never-
theless is unwilling to correct that interpretation because Congress has not acted in the
wake of the Court's erroneous decision. Id.
When it "interprets" the inaction of post-enactment Congresses, the Court exceeds the
legitimate exercise of its constitutional power. The conduct of post-enactment Congresses
is not germane to the issue of the intent of the enacting Congress. The Congress or Con-
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securities laws support the application of the doctrine.362 The Court has
gresses which do not act to correct a court decision are not the same Congress which en-
acted the statute. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 174 n.11 (1976). The
Supreme Court is not even willing to accept the comments of legislators after the enact-
ment of a statute as evidence of the enacting Congress's intent. See, e.g., Grove City Col-
lege v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 566-68 (1984); Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S.
102, 132 (1974). The Court has found that "the views of a subsequent Congress form a
hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one." Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446
U.S. 657, 666 n.8 (1980) (quoting United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)); see also
United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 33 n.9 (1980).
Indeed, while it is easy to identify the Congress that enacted the initial legislation, and
even easier to identify expressed post-enactment statements, it is virtually impossible to
identify the Congress, Congresses, or legislators which have not passed corrective legisla-
tion. The Court purports to administer the intent of a series of diffuse Congresses which
apparently have expressed their intent through their silence after the enactment. When
the Court presumes congressional intent from congressional inaction, therefore, it fails to
interpret the intent of the Congress which enacted the statute.
Moreover, under the doctrine of legislative acquiescence, the Court purposefully gives
more power to the inaction of post-enactment Congresses than it does to the intent of the
enacting Congress. The doctrine presumes that the Court has discovered that its prior
interpretation of a statute is incorrect. Yet, the Court is willing to maintain that knowingly
wrong interpretation of the intent of the enacting Congress merely because post-enactment
Congresses have failed to act. Professor Marshall writes: "It is downright silly for a court
that takes this stand with respect to rather contemporaneous and explicit post-enactment
history to afford extraordinary significance to far removed and ambiguous inaction." Mar-
shall, supra note 359, 193-94.
Judges and scholars long have disagreed about the proper balance of power between the
legislature and the judiciary. See, e.g., CHOPER, supra; Martin H. Redish, Federal Common
Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: An "Institutionalist" Perspective, 83
Nw. U. L. REv. 761 (1989); Steven D. Smith, Why Should Courts Obey the Law?, 77 GEO.
L.J. 113 (1988). No matter where one strikes that balance, there can be no legitimate
dispute that the Constitution does not empower the federal courts to apply a congressional
statute in a manner that is knowingly contrary to the intent of the legislature which enacted
the statute. That is precisely the effect of the doctrine of legislative acquiescence.
.362. The evidence of congressional approval of the private remedy seems particularly
strong because Congress has revisited the federal securities laws on many occasions with-
out "correcting" the judicial creation of the private remedy. During the years in which
private recovery has been recognized under § 10(b), Congress has considered and passed
ten major legislative amendments to the 1934 Act. The major revisions of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 during the period from 1968 to the present, are:
1. Act of July 19, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (regulating tender offers).
2. Act of December 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497 (1970) (granting SEC
regulatory authority to define and proscribe fraudulent practices).
3. Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975).
4. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977).
5. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984).
6. Government Securities Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-571, 100 Stat. 3208 (1986) (provid-
ing for regulation of broker-dealers in government securities).
7. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677
(1988) (providing private right of action based on contemporaneous insider trading).
8. Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stocks Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (1990).
9. Market Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-432, 104 Stat. 963 (1990) (granting SEC
power to suspend trading for protection of investors, and to limit practices which result in
market volatility).
10. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
242, 105 Stat. 2387 (1991) (providing a special statute of limitations for cases filed pre-
Lampf).
When Congress passed the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of
1988 (the 1988 Act) (enacting 15 U.S.C. §§ 78t-1, 78u-1, and 80b-4a, and amending id.
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stated that it would have "trouble inferring" congressional acquiescence
in the federal courts' creation of private securities law remedies. 363
Even if Congress had acquiesced by its silence to an expansion of fed-
eral judicial power beyond that contemplated in section 14(a) or section
10(b), or in the general grants of federal subject-matter jurisdiction, how-
ever, the federal courts could not constitutionally accept that power. The
§§ 78c, 78o, 78u, 78ff, 78kk) it preserved even all "implied" remedies under the 1934 Act.
Id § 78t-1. Most recently, in 1991, when Congress enacted § 27A of the 1934 Act reinstat-
ing statute of limitations periods for § 10(b), it specifically referred to the § 10(b) private
remedy. Id. § 78aa-1 (1994).
By the time Congress amended the securities laws in 1988 and certainly by the time it
added § 27A to the 1934 Act in 1991, the "consensus" in the lower federal courts concern-
ing § 10(b)'s private remedy was "old" and "overwhelming." See Curran, 456 U.S. at 380.
The Supreme Court in Curran suggests that the consensus regarding the private remedy
under the Commodities Exchange Act was not so "old" or so "overwhelming" as that
under § 10(b). That the Court was willing to infer the congressional intent to create the
private Commodities Exchange Act remedy suggests that a fortiori it would do so in the
context of § 10(b). According to the Supreme Court, "the fact that a comprehensive reex-
amination and significant amendment of [a statute] left intact the statutory provisions
under which the federal courts had implied a cause of action is itself evidence that Con-
gress affirmatively intended to preserve that remedy." Curran, 456 U.S. at 381-82 (holding
that the congressional revisitation of the Commodity Exchange Act without altering the
provision from which the courts had implied a private remedy indicates the congressional
intent to maintain that remedy).
Additional evidence that Congress factored Supreme Court decisions into its lawmaking
process, contrary to suggestions otherwise, is found in the legislative history of both the
1988 Act and § 27A, which indicates a congressional preoccupation with these decisions.
The legislative history of the 1988 Act is replete with references to Supreme Court deci-
sions limiting the reach of congressional legislation designed to prevent insider trading.
Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 6043 (1988). The history indicates that Congress intended to
codify a theory of liability for misappropriating material non-public information, a theory
which the Supreme Court had touched upon, but had never approved. The legislative his-
tory mentions Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987), in which the Supreme Court
divided 4-4 on the merits of the misappropriation theory. Id. at 28. Similarly, when Con-
gress enacted § 27A of the 1934 Act, it plainly was aware of the Supreme Court's decision
in Lampf Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991), which
created a uniform, retroactive statute of limitations period for § 10(b) actions. Section 27A
was not only enacted in direct response to the Court's Lampf decision, it actually incorpo-
rates that decision and the date on which it was rendered as terms in the legislation itself.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (1994). That section provides:
Special provision relating to statute of limitations on private causes of action
(a) Effect on pending causes of action
The limitation period for any private civil action implied under Section
78j(b) of this title that was commenced on or before June 19, 1991, shall be
the limitation period provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, in-
cluding principles of retroactivity, as such laws existed on June 19, 1991.
(b) Effect on dismissed causes of action
Any private civil action implied under Section 78j(b) of this title that was
commenced on or before June 19, 1991-
(1) which was discussed as time barred subsequent to June 19, 1991, and
(2) which would have been timely filed under the limitation period pro-
vided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles of retro-
activity, as such laws existed on June 19, 1991, shall be reinstated on motion
by the plaintiff not later than 60 days after Dec. 19, 1991.
15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (1994).
363. Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1104 (1991) (rejecting a con-
gressional acquiescence argument for extending § 14(a) of the 1934 Act); 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(a) (1994).
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Constitution grants to Congress the sole authority to create the lower
federal courts and to assign to them subject-matter jurisdiction.364 Con-
gress can only create the lower federal courts and assign to them subject-
matter jurisdiction through the legislative process. 365 Congress cannot,
by its inaction, delegate judicial power to the lower federal courts.366 The
Constitution prohibits the federal courts from accepting judicial power
not delegated by an act of Congress. 367 Accordingly, the Supreme Court
cannot permit the federal courts to accept judicial power absent such a
delegation.368 Congress, therefore, cannot by its acquiescence delegate
federal judicial power.
In its reliance upon the uncertain origins of implied rights of action for
securities fraud to guide its statutory interpretations, the Court engages in
a form of result-guided reasoning. Its decisions are overtly legislative, yet
they are not without principle. The Court's apparent effort to contract
the reach of section 10(b) can be seen as an effort to curtail the original
judicial transgression, which resulted in the creation of the section 10(b)
implied right of action.
The Supreme Court never has reached the question whether the im-
plied rights of action of under sections 14(a) and 10(b) arise under federal
law for jurisdictional purposes. Instead, the Court has interpreted the
elements of liability in cases in which the section 10(b) or section 14(a)
claim had some independent jurisdictional basis, such as supplemental ju-
risdiction. In these cases, the Court's effort to restrict the implied claim
can be viewed as a principled effort to prevent an unwarranted expansion
of the federal court's limited jurisdiction.
These narrowing interpretations of private remedies make clear that
the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited and will not
be expanded by the judiciary. Until the Supreme Court squarely reaches
the issue of the jurisdictional basis for implied securities fraud remedies,
its decisions limiting the scope of those remedies are at least consistent
with its obligation to circumscribe the federal courts' limited subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction.
Further, the Court's decision to recognize an implied right of action for
contribution in Musick369 is consistent with this jurisdictional principle.
A right of action for contribution under the federal securities laws as-
sumes as its predicate that a claim already has been filed in federal court
for securities fraud liability.370 Because claims created by section 10(b)
364. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; id. art. I, § 8.
365. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
366. Id.
367. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2; see also American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341
U.S. 6, 17-18 (1951).
368. Finn, 341 U.S. at 18.
369. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins., 113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993).
370. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a). The Rule authorizes a defendant sued in federal
court to file a third-party claim against any person "not a party to the action who is or may




are exclusively vested in federal court,371 any implied right of contribu-
tion for section 10(b) liability necessarily follows a claim filed in federal
court for securities fraud. 372 Without determining whether the federal
courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over the initial claim for securities
fraud, the Supreme Court could still create an implied right of contribu-
tion within the federal courts' jurisdiction.
In the typical case where a plaintiff sues a defendant for securities
fraud, the defendant may assert an action for contribution even in the
absence of any independent subject-matter jurisdiction over the contribu-
tion action. This is because Congress has granted the federal courts "sup-
plemental jurisdiction" to resolve non-federal and non-diverse claims
which are so related to a federal or a diverse claim that they are part of
the same case.373 A claim for contribution, which necessarily asserts that
a third-party defendant may be liable to the third-party plaintiff for all or
part of that third-party plaintiff's securities fraud liability to the original
plaintiff, will invariably be within Congress's grant of supplemental juris-
diction.374 In fact, Congress even gave federal courts the power to hear
such contribution claims where the only basis for jurisdiction in federal
court is diversity. 375 Thus, even if the Supreme Court properly concluded
that an implied right of action for a violation of the federal securities laws
has no independent "arising under" subject-matter jurisdiction in federal
court, it could still consistently conclude that the federal courts have sup-
plemental jurisdiction over any implied right to contribution.
Third, in light of the jurisdictional principle, the Musick opinion is even
consistent with Central Bank.376 Unlike the contribution claims at issue
in Musick, the aiding and abetting claims at issue in Central Bank were
not necessarily within the supplemental jurisdiction of the federal courts.
The perpetuation of a federal, implied right of action for aiding and abet-
ting securities fraud would have represented an unconstitutional expan-
sion of federal judicial power which no amount of lower court precedent
could justify.377 Accordingly, the Central Bank Court was justified in re-
jecting the widely-held lower court view accepting the cause of action.378
The Court simply refused to tolerate an unconstitutional expansion of
federal subject-matter jurisdiction.
Its holding, however, should be limited to the rejection of a federal
judicial power to create a federal cause of action which would afford the
federal courts "arising under" jurisdiction over that action. The Central
Bank holding does not specifically address the different question whether
371. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1994).
372. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a); see also 6 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1446 (2d ed. 1990).
373. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
374. Id.
375. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
376. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
377. See discussion supra Section V.A.
378. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1439.
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the federal courts have the power to adjudicate state law claims for aiding
and abetting securities fraud violations, where federal subject-matter ju-
risdiction otherwise exists. For example, the Court has the power to rec-
ognize state law aiding and abetting claims in diversity cases.379 It may
also recognize such claims in an action in which the SEC or private inves-
tors bring claims against primary violators of section 10(b) or other reme-
dial provisions of the federal securities laws together with related claims
against secondary violators of section 10(b). 380 In such actions, the fed-
eral courts generally will have supplemental jurisdiction over the claims
against the secondary violators.38' Even if, as the Supreme Court held in
Central Bank, the claims against the secondary violators are not created
by federal law, 382 Congress has given the federal courts jurisdiction to
hear those claims if they are so related to the claims against the primary
violators as to be part of the same case.383
From this jurisdictional perspective, however, an aiding and abetting
claim is fundamentally different from a contribution claim. An aiding
and abetting claim does not necessarily depend on the filing of a primary
securities fraud claim. In direct contrast, a federal contribution claim
must follow a securities fraud claim already filed in federal court. 384 The
federal courts invariably will have supplemental jurisdiction over the con-
tribution claim. They will not invariably have supplemental jurisdiction
over an aiding and abetting claim.
VI. THE SUPREME COURT'S REJECTION OF THE
JURISDICTIONAL PRINCIPLE IN ALLOYD AND
PLAUT
Although this jurisdictional principle can justify the Supreme Court's
implied right of action decisions, that principle cannot explain the Court's
Alloyd 385 and Plaut386 decisions. It can only serve to minimize the extent
of the Court's improper rejection of jurisdiction.
A. LIMITING THE COURT'S REJECTION OF JURISDICTION IN ALLOYD:
SECTION 12(2) STILL APPLIES TO PRIVATE PLACEMENT
Congress has given the federal courts "concurrent" jurisdiction over
section 12(2) claims.387 Section 12(2) expressly creates a private right of
379. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988) (authorizing the federal courts to adjudicate any state law
claim where diversity exists).
380. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1988 & Supp. V 1994) (authorizing the federal courts to adjudi-
cate any state law claim which is "so related" to a joined claim that arises under federal law
as to be part of the same constitutional case).
381. Id.
382. 114 S. Ct. at 1455.
383. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
384. See FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) (a contribution claim must allege that the contributing
defendant may be liable for "part" of any liability running to the original plaintiff).
385. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061 (1995).
386. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995).
387. 15 U.S.C. § 77o(a) (1994).
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action. Even under the most restrictive view of the federal courts' "aris-
ing under" jurisdiction, there is no doubt that Congress has empowered
the federal courts to resolve such claims.388 Nonetheless, in Alloyd, the
Court refused to accept the grant of power which Congress has given to
the federal courts by discarding the plain language of the federal securi-
ties laws. The jurisdictional principle demands that the holding in Alloyd
be narrowly construed. While the language in the opinion is ambiguous,
the jurisdictional principle requires limiting Alloyd's rejection of jurisdic-
tion to only those section 12(2) claims which allege misstatements in a
stock purchase agreement in a secondary securities transaction not in-
volving an issuer.
The Supreme Court's decision holds only that section 12(2) is inappli-
cable to misstatements in a stock purchase agreement in a secondary
transaction, i.e., a purchase of securities not from the issuer. Properly
read, Alloyd does not address the applicability of section 12(2) to an of-
fering memorandum provided to prospective purchasers in an initial or
"primary" distribution of securities, i.e., from the issuer in a transaction
exempt from registration as a private placement under section 4(2) of the
Securities Act.
The question presented in Alloyd was "whether [the] right of rescission
extends to a private, secondary transaction, on the theory that recitations
in the purchase agreement are part of a 'prospectus.' ,,389 The plaintiffs in
Alloyd purchased the stock not from the issuer but from stockholders,
and sought to base their claim for rescission upon representations and
warranties contained in their stock purchase agreement-not on any of-
fering memorandum provided in connection with the sale. 390 The district
court rejected the claim, relying on the Third Circuit's decision in Ballay
v. Legg Mason Wood Walter Inc. ,391 and held that section 12(2) claims
"can only arise out of the initial stock offerings. '392 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit vacated that judgment in light of its inter-
vening decision in Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co. ,393 which
reasoned that the term "communication" in the Securities Act's defini-
tion of "prospectus" meant that the term prospectus was defined "very
broadly" to include all written communications that offered a sale of se-
curities, "including the stock purchase agreement in the present case. 394
The Supreme Court in Alloyd granted certiorari "to resolve this Circuit
conflict. '395 Alloyd thus considered the applicability of section 12(2) to
misstatements made by selling shareholders in a stock purchase agree-
ment or in a secondary transaction.
388. See discussion supra Section V.A.
389. Alloyd, 115 S. Ct. at 1064.
390. Id. at 1064-65.
391. 925 F.2d 682 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 820 (1991).
392. Alloyd, 115 S. Ct. at 1065.
393. 993 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 907, and cert. dism'd, 114 S. Ct.
1146 (1994).
394. Id. at 595, quoted in Alloyd, 115 S. Ct. at 1065.
395. Alloyd, 115 S. Ct. at 1065.
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The majority opinion's analysis in Alloyd focused on "[t]he determina-
tive question [of] whether the contract between Alloyd and Gustafson
[was] a 'prospectus' as the term [was] used in the 1933 Act. '396 The
Court began its analysis with section 10 of the Act.397 Because section 10
requires a "prospectus" to contain the same information required in a
registration statement, unless there is an "overriding exemption,"398 the
Court reasoned that a stock purchase contract is not a prospectus:
There is no dispute that the contract in this case was not required to
contain the information contained in a registration statement and
that no statutory exemption was required to take the document out
of § 10's coverage. It follows that the contract is not a prospectus
under § 10. That does not mean that a document ceases to be a pro-
spectus whenever it omits a required piece of information. It does
mean that a document is not a prospectus within the meaning of that
section if, absent an exemption, it need not comply with § 10's re-
quirements in the first place.
An examination of § 10 reveals that, whatever else "prospectus"
may mean, the term is confined to a document that, absent an over-
riding exemption, must include the "information contained in the re-
gistration statement. ' 399
The Court added:
By and large, only public offerings by an issuer of a security, or by
controlling shareholders of an issuer, require the preparation and fil-
ing of registration statements. It follows, we conclude, that a pro-
spectus under § 10 is confined to documents related to public
offerings by an issuer or its controlling shareholders. 4°°
Noting that the circuit split on section 12(2) had turned on whether the
term prospectus was required to be read consistently in both sections 10
and 12-as the Third Circuit in Ballay401 held-the Court then concluded
that the term "must have the same meaning under §§ 10 and 12."402
Thus: "If the contract before us is not a prospectus for purposes of § 10-
as all must and do concede-it is not a prospectus for purposes of § 12
either.1403 The Court then synthesized the scope of section 12(2) as fol-
lows: "[T]he liability imposed by § 12(2), cannot attach unless there is an
obligation to distribute the prospectus in the first place (or unless there is
an exemption)." 404
396. Id. at 1066. The opinion noted that the parties and the Courts of Appeals had all
agreed that the "oral communication" referred to in § 12(2) was "restricted to oral commu-
nications that relate to a prospectus." Id.
397. 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1994).
398. Alloyd, 115 S. Ct. at 1067.
399. Id. (citation omitted).
400. Id. (citation omitted).
401. Ballay v. Legg Mason Mann Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 820 (1991).





The stock purchase contract at issue in Alloyd was thus held not to be a
prospectus because there was no dispute that (1) the contract between
the seller and the purchaser was not a required disclosure of any kind
under the 1933 Act; and (2) "no statutory exemption was required to take
the document out of § 10's coverage. '405 The same reasoning demon-
strates the applicability of section 12(2) to situations in which sellers have
an obligation under the 1933 Act to provide information,406 and in which
their offering memoranda would have to comply with the registration
statements requirement of section 10 but for the existence of a statutory
exemption under section 4(2) of the Act.40 7
Nowhere does the Court state that an initial distribution in the form of
a private placement falls outside section 12(2), or that an offering memo-
randum used in such an initial distribution is immunized from section
12(2).408 When the Court first introduced the "public offering" language
into its opinion, it did so using expressly qualified terminology: "By and
large, only public offerings by an issuer of a security, or by controlling
stockholders of an issuer, require the preparation and filing of registra-
tion statements," from which the Court concluded that "a prospectus
under § 10 is confined to documents related to public offerings by an is-
suer or its controlling shareholders. ' 40 9 To read into this and related lan-
guage, which was not necessary to resolution of the circuit conflict or
question presented on certiorari, the conclusion that Alloyd forecloses
section 12(2) liability in private initial distributions, would be an unwar-
405. Id.
406. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d)(4)(i) (1994); see also United States v. Lindo, 18
F.3d 353, 358 (6th Cir. 1994) (construing § 4(2), the court stated: "[A] transaction 'not
involving any public offering' [exempted by § 4(2)] occurs when buyers have access to the
kind of information contained in a registration statement").
407. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1994). The majority opinion referred to the exemptions from§ 10 under § 3 of the Act. Id. § 77c. The § 4 exemptions are transactions exemptions, not
securities exemptions as in § 3, for the most part-although § 3 does include several trans-
action exemptions as well (see id. § 77c(a)(9), (a)(10), (a)(11), (b), (c)). As Professors
Loss & Seligman explain, there is no careful "dichotomy" between § 3 and § 4, and
"[nione of the exemptions in either § 3 or 4 extends to the fraud provisions of § 17 or the
provision in § 12(2) creating civil liability for the sale of securities by misleading statements
or omissions." Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULA-
TION 262, 264 (3d ed. 1995) (emphasis added). The § 3 exemptions are explicitly refer-
enced in the beginning of § 12(2) because § 3 exempts those securities from the entire Act;§ 4 exemptions are limited to the registration requirements of § 5.
408. Justice Ginsberg, in her dissent, characterizes the majority as declaring that
"[c]ommunications during either secondary trading or a private placement are not 'pro-
spectuses,'... and thus are not covered by § 12(2)." Alloyd, 115 S. Ct. at 1079. Aside from
the fact that the opinion of the Court does not discuss or even mention private placements,
the binding authority is the holding contained in the majority opinion rather than the dis-
sent's characterization of the holding. See Marino v. Bowers, 657 F.2d 1363, 1368 (3d. Cir.
1981) (en banc) ("Were we to require individuals to be guided in their actions by dissenting
opinions we would stand the system of stare decisis on its head."); id at 1375 (Weis, J.,
dissenting)("While the dissent ... characterized the holding as a dramatic break with the
past, the majority expressed no similar sentiments, and it is the majority opinion that must
be studied to determine if a new legal principle has been announced.").
409. Alloyd, 115 S. Ct. at 1067 (emphasis added).
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ranted extension of the Court's narrow rejection of federal subject-matter
jurisdiction.
Indeed, the Court suggested that it employed the "public offering"
phraseology simply to distinguish initial offerings from secondary transac-
tions, and not to exclude all initial but privately placed offerings by distin-
guishing offerings available to the general public from everything else. In
describing the "primary innovation" of the 1933 Act as the creation of
federal duties "in connection with public offerings," the Court relied on a
statement from a prior opinion that described the Act's concern as "ini-
tial distributions of newly issued stock from corporate issuers. '410 A pri-
vate placement by the issuer is an initial distribution of newly issued
stock.
Similarly, in supporting its holding by reference to the Court's earlier
section 17(a) decision in Naftalin,411 the Alloyd opinion, while referring
to the term " prospectus" as relating "to public offerings by issuers," re-
lied on Naftalin's statement that section 17(a) was "intended to cover any
fraudulent scheme in an offer or sale of securities, whether in the course
of an initial distribution or in the course of ordinary market trading. '412
The Court noted that Naftalin had identified the 1933 Act's primary "con-
cer[n] with the regulation of new offerings," and that Naftalin extended
section 17(a) to an "initial distribution" as well as "ordinary market trad-
ing" in "a major departure from th[e] limitation [of the 1933 Act for new
offerings]., 413
That the Court's "public" terminology was not intended to remove all
private placements from coverage is further suggested by the opinion's
discussion of section 2(10) of the Act, the definition of "prospectus." The
opinion rejected reading that definition's inclusion of "communication"
to mean that "prospectus" includes all communications (such as a private
stock purchase agreement). The Court reasoned from the various terms
included in the definition, "prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement...
letter ... [or] communication," that "it is apparent that the list refers to
documents of wide dissemination. '414 Unlike the individualized stock
purchase agreement claimed to be a prospectus in Alloyd, private offer-
ings may require the wide dissemination of communications with inves-
tors. Likewise, the Court's desire that section 12(2) not extend to "every
casual communication between buyer and seller in the secondary mar-
ket," but rather be limited to "misstatements contained in a document
prepared with care, following well established procedures relating to in-
vestigations with due diligence,"415 would not be contravened by section
410. See id. (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 752
(1975)).
411. United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979).
412. Alloyd, 115 S. Ct. at 1070 (quoting Naftalin, 441 U.S. at 777-78).
413. Id. (bracketed language in original). See also Ballay, 925 F.2d at 690-91 & n.10
(noting that the 1933 Act addressed "initial" as opposed to "secondary" distributions).
414. Alloyd, 115 S. Ct. at 1070.
415. Id. at 1071.
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12(2)'s application in initial private distributions. Offerors engaged in a
private offering certainly treat the preparation and dissemination of offer-
ing memoranda as a major exercise of their due diligence. Attachment of
section 12(2) liability to such offering memoranda would not in any sense
extend liability to "every casual conversation between buyer and seller in
the secondary market. ' 416
The use of the phrase "public offering" merely as shorthand to exclude
secondary market transactions can also be seen in the Court's legislative
history discussion. The opinion argued that Congress intended section
12(2) to apply "only to public offerings by an issuer (or a controlling
shareholder)" by quoting the House Report's statement that "[t]he bill
affects only new offering of securities.... It does not affect the ordinary
redistribution of securities unless such redistribution takes on the charac-
teristics of a new offering. '417 An initial distribution from the issuer is a
"new offering of securities" whether it takes the form of a private place-
ment or a public issuance. So, too, the majority opinion's emphasis on
the indications in the legislative history that liability attaches to the "orig-
inators of securities" is perfectly compatible with section 12(2) liability as
to all types of initial distributions, public or privately placed, while ex-
cluding all types of secondary transactions. 418 Reading Alloyd to exclude
from section 12(2) all initial offerings that take the form of private place-
ments thus, is not compelled by the opinion itself.
Reading Alloyd broadly also would be irreconcilable with the Supreme
Court's own recent decision recognizing that Congress has given the fed-
eral courts jurisdiction over section 12(2) claims involving a privately
placed initial offering of securities. In Randall v. Loftsgaarden,419 the
Court was presented with a question regarding the scope of rescissory
damages available to a purchaser under section 12(2). The Court held
that tax benefits received by the investor through the purchase of the
securities did not constitute "income received," or a return of "considera-
tion" within the language of section 12(2), and thus need not be sub-
tracted from the purchase price in calculating damages.420 In Randall,
the Court applied section 12(2) to private placement of limited partner-
ship units conducted through an offering memorandum in a transaction
that was exempt from the registration requirements of the 1933 Act as a
private offering.421 If Alloyd intended to limit section 12(2) to a public
distribution by the issuer to the exclusion of private initial distributions,
then the Supreme Court would have mentioned that it was limiting its
prior decision in Randall. But Alloyd nowhere mentions Randall, and
416. Id
417. Id at 1072 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933)).
418. Alloyd, 115 S. Ct. at 1073.
419. 478 U.S. 647 (1986).
420. Id at 648.
421. See Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 768 F.2d 949, 957 & n.13 (8th Cir. 1985), rev'd sub
nom., Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647 (1986).
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lower courts should not lightly assume that a Supreme Court decision is
overruled sub silentio.4 22
Similarly, the Court has held that "although § 4(2) of the 1933 Act...
exempts transactions not involving any public offering from the Act's re-
gistration provisions, there is no comparable exemption from the an-
tifraud provisions. '423 If Alloyd truly intended to exclude the section
4(2) exempted transactions from the antifraud provision of section 12(2),
then it would have at least mentioned that it was departing from the
prominent view and practice to the contrary.
Moreover, lower federal courts, applying the Third Circuit's holding in
Ballay that the term prospectus "describes the transmittal of information
concerning the sale of a security in an initial distribution,"-a decision
specifically upheld in Alloyd424-have held that a purchaser of stock pur-
suant to a private placement stated a claim under section 12(2) of the
Securities Act "with respect to all initial purchases of ... stock. '425 The
courts also have held that because Ballay's holding that section 12(2) ap-
plies "only to initial distributions and not to secondary transactions," sec-
tion 12(2) liability does not extend to securities purchased in the
secondary market.426
Like Ballay, other courts, holding that section 12(2) does not apply to
secondary market transactions, have nevertheless held that initial
purchases from the issuer in private placements are within the scope of
section 12(2).427 Indeed, "every Court of Appeals to consider the issue
has ruled that private placements are subject to § 12(2)."428 Any sugges-
tion that section 12(2) does not cover private placements, in light of Al-
loyd, must be rejected. For if the Supreme Court intended to overturn
every circuit precedent regarding private placements, it would have done
422. See Amato v. Wilentz, 952 F.2d 742, 749 (3d Cir. 1991); In re School Asbestos
Litigation, 921 F.2d 1310, 1318 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 976 (1991) ("The
[Supreme] Court knows how to state explicitly that a previous decision is no longer to be
followed; ... it also knows how to send signals that it will be reconsidering a previous
ruling.").
423. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 692 (1985). See also Nor-Tex
Agencies, Inc. v. Jones, 482 F.2d 1093, 1099 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977(1974) ("The so-called private offer exemption of section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933
... only exempts a transaction from the registration requirements of [§ 5], and does not
exempt a transaction from the anti-fraud provisions of sections 12(2) of the '33 act or Rule
10b-5 under the '34 act.").
424. The circuit conflict that the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve in Alloyd
was between the Third Circuit's holding in Ballay and the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Pacific Dunlop. The Supreme Court resolved the conflict in favor of Ballay.
425. In re Phar-Mor, Inc. Securities Litigation, 164 B.R. 903 (Bankr W.D. Pa. 1994);
MFS Lifetime Emerging Growth Fund v. County NatWest Global Sec., No. CIV.A. 93-521,
1993 WL 623308, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 1993) (emphasis added).
426. Id. See also Insurance Consultants of Am., Inc. v. Southeastern Ins. Group, Inc.,
746 F. Supp. 390 (D.N.J. 1990) (applying § 12(2) to private placements); Mondrow v. Foun-
tain House, No. Civ. A. 87-5091, 1989 WL 101656 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 1989).
427. Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 360-61 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 2445 (1993); Haralson v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 919 F.2d 1014, 1032 (5th Cir. 1990);
see Kaufman & Enzer Joint Venture v. Dedman, 680 F. Supp. 805, 813 (W.D. La. 1987).
428. Alloyd, 115 S. Ct. at 1082 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (collecting cases).
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so explicitly. Nowhere in the opinion did the Court do so. Such a mas-
sive sub silentio overruling should not be inferred, particularly where do-
ing so would further extend the Court's rejection of the express
congressional grant of jurisdiction over section 12(2) claims.429
B. THE COURT'S REJECTION OF JURISDICTION IN PLAUT
In its prior implied right of action decisions, the Court narrowly de-
fined the parameters of those actions without reaching the fundamental
question of the limits of federal court jurisdiction. In Plaut,430 by con-
trast, the Court quickly reached the question of the limits of congres-
sional power. Yet, the statute which it addresses is arguably the only hint
that Congress ever has granted the federal courts jurisdiction over a class
of cases arising under section 10(b). Section 27A(b) is an express grant of
subject-matter jurisdiction to the federal courts over some implied private
rights of action under section 10(b). It is the only grant of subject-matter
jurisdiction over such actions. It is a limited grant. The federal courts
have the power, upon a proper and timely filed motion, to reinstate and
to resolve on its merits a private civil action for the violation of section
10(b) that was: (1) commenced on or before June 19, 1991; (2) dismissed
as time barred after June 19, 1991; and (3) timely filed under the limita-
tions period applicable in the jurisdiction in existence on or before June19, 1991. 431
This is an express grant of subject-matter jurisdiction. It is a grant of
power to the federal courts, not a usurpation of power. In light of the fact
that section 27A(b) is the only express delegation of jurisdiction which
Congress has ever given the federal courts over section 10(b) claims and
in light of the judicial history of accepting and interpreting such claims in
the absence of any such grant of jurisdiction, the Court's determination
that this express grant of power to the federal judiciary exceeds Con-
gress's power is truly anomalous.
VII. CONCLUSION
While the jurisdictional principle may serve to reconcile the Supreme
Court's apparently inconsistent implied right of action securities fraud de-
cisions, that principle cannot explain the Court's rejection of jurisdiction
over express rights of action for section 10(b) and section 12(2) liability.
Nor can that principle justify the Court's perpetuation of any independ-
ent jurisdictional basis for a federal implied right of action for securities
fraud.
429. See Linn v. Andover Newton Theological Sch., Inc., 874 F.2d 1, 8 n.9 (1st Cir.
1989) ("We will not lightly presume that the [Supreme] Court intended to overrule, sub
silentio, a view held by virtually every circuit to have considered the issue."); Bartlett v.
Bowen, 816 F.2d 695, 719 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Bork, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 940
(1988).
430. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995).
431. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-l(b) (1994).
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Viewed as a whole, the Supreme Court's securities fraud cases actually
have flaunted the will of Congress. The Court initially permitted an ex-
pansion of its jurisdiction to entertain judicially-created private remedies
where Congress had refused to do so. Now the Court has eviscerated the
private remedies which Congress has expressly created. It is no wonder
in Alloyd that Justice Thomas warned.Congress that the Court's method-
ology is "frustrating Congress' will."'432 If, as the dissent in Alloyd sug-
gests, all the "key words" in a securities fraud statute will be defined by
the Court in light of the Court's own policy objectives, "there should be
no need for Congress to attempt to define them. '433 Indeed, if the Court
is prepared to expand its own jurisdiction where Congress has refused to
do so, and to deny private remedies where Congress has expressly de-
cided to create them, there would be no need for Congress to act at all.
Such an interplay between Congress and the Supreme Court regarding
private remedies under the federal securities laws represents a startling
judicial rejection of the constitutionally mandated separation of powers.
As Congress revisits its securities fraud legislation, it stands forewarned
that its language may be subject to judicial revision. All that Congress
can do is to attempt to make its securities fraud legislation so clear and so
comprehensive that not even a result-guided judiciary can justify its intru-
sions upon the legislative branch of government. A truly clear and com-
prehensive legislative scheme should include a definitive expression of
the precise power which Congress intends to delegate to the federal
judiciary.
432. Alloyd, 115 S. Ct. at 1079 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
433. Id.
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